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NOTES
Untangling "Operation Common Sense": Reopening and
Review of Social Security Administration Disability Claims
In 1980, as part of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare's1 "Operation Common Sense," the Social Security Administra-
tion ("SSA") reorganized and restated in "simpler language" the
regulations governing the process for adjudicating disability claims.2
The purpose of this revision was "to make [the regulations] clearer
and easier for the public to use."'3 Unfortunately, as one court has
noted, "the [new regulations] are not a model of clarity in draftsman-
ship."' 4 Instead, portions of the new regulations have only confused
both claimants and courts.
The regulations that have engendered this confusion establish the
five steps through which a claimant pursues a disability claim. Under
the regulations, the claimant first files for an initial determination. 5 A
claimant dissatisfied with the initial determination may request a re-
consideration.6 If still dissatisfied after the reconsideration, the claim-
ant may request a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")
of the SSA's Bureau of Hearing and Appeals. 7 After a decision by an
ALJ, the claimant may request a review by the Bureau's Appeals
Council.8 Finally, if still dissatisfied, the claimant may file an action
challenging the claim determination in a federal district court.9
In addition to the five normal steps for adjudicating a claim, a
claim may also be reopened under a separate section of the regula-
1. Effective May 4, 1980, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was
redesignated the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). Department of Educa-
tion Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (93 Stat.)
668, 695.
2. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,078 (1980) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-.999). These regulations
also apply to Supplemental Security Insurance and some Medicare benefits. See infra note 18.
3. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,078 (1980) (Summary).
4. Weinstein v. Bowen, 666 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 1987). The SSA has acknowl-
edged this, and is considering revising these regulations. See infra note 142.
5. 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 (1988). The initial determination is the determination made by the
SSA that is "subject to administrative and judicial review. The initial determination will state
the important facts and give the reasons for [its] conclusions." 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 (1988). See
infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
6. 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (1988); see infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
7. 20 C.F.R. § 404.930 (1988); see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. The SSA is a
branch of the Department of Health and Human Services. The Appeals Council and the AL~s
are components of the Bureau of Hearing and Appeals, which is part of the SSA.
8. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1988); see infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
9. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1988); see infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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tions. 1° A claim may be reopened within one year for any reason,
within four years for "good cause," and at any time for certain statuto-
rily enumerated reasons such as fraud or similar fault.11 There has
been sharp disagreement among courts over who may initiate this re-
opening. Although all courts, the Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS"), and claimants agree that a claimant may request
that a claim be reopened, 12 disagreement exists over the Appeals
Council's ability to reopen sua sponte. 13
Six courts of appeals have addressed this question directly. The
First Circuit has held that only claimants may initiate reopening by
the Appeals Council. 14 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits,
adopting the interpretation urged by the Secretary of HHS ("the Sec-
retary"), 15 allow either the claimant or the Appeals Council to initiate
the reopening process. 16 The Eleventh Circuit has rejected both of
these positions and created a "components analysis" to determine
when the Appeals Council has the authority to initiate reopening of a
claim, and when only the claimant may petition the Appeals Council
for reopening. 17
This Note examines these conflicting interpretations of the regula-
10. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989 (1988).
11. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988 (1988).
12. See, eg., McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 169-71 (Ist Cir.
1987).
13. Compare McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 634 F. Supp. 431 (D.N.H.
1985) (only claimants, and not the Appeals Council, may initiate reopening), modified, 817 F.2d
161 (1st Cir. 1987); Weinstein v. Bowen, 666 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (same); and Delong
v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting in dicta that only claimants may initiate
reopening) with Fox v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1987) (Appeals Council has the authority
to reopen sua sponte); Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Munsinger v.
Schweiker, 709 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Butterworth v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1379 (11th
Cir. 1986) (creating a components analysis to decide when the Appeals Council has the ability to
reopen sua sponte) and Marsh v. Heckler, [Sept. 84-Apr. 85 Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep.
(CCH) (E.D. Cal. 1984) (unpublished decision limiting reopening to errors of fact), affd. in part,
revd. in part, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. McCuin, 817 F.2d at 167-75.
15. Although not technically the same, the terms "the Secretary" and "the SSA" will be used
interchangeably throughout this Note. The SSA is part of HHS and the Commissioner of the
SSA reports to the Secretary, who approves final policy decisions.
16. The Eighth Circuit was the first to decide this issue, in Munsinger v. Schweiker, 709 F.2d
1212 (8th Cir. 1983). This court noted that only the SSA would have an interest in raising
certain of the criteria for reopening, such as fraud, and held that the Appeals Council may re-
open sua sponte. 709 F.2d at 1215. The Fourth Circuit summarily held that the Appeals Council
has the power to reopen. Zimmermann v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1985). In its
decision, the court relied upon the reopening regulations alone. 774 F.2d at 617. The Fifth
Circuit relied on Munsinger, but provided a more thorough examination of the regulations.
Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1987); see infra section II.A. Finally, the Sixth Circuit
rejected a district court holding that had allowed sua sponte reopening for errors of law but not
for errors of fact and held that the Appeals Council may reopen sua sponte for both types of
errors. Fox v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (6th Cir. 1987); see infra notes 137-40 and accom-
panying text.
17. Butterworth v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1379 (1lth Cir. 1986).
Michigan Law Review
tions governing the reopening of claims and concludes that none of the
interpretations adopted by the courts dispels the many inconsistencies
in the language of the regulations. As a result, this Note proposes an
alternative reading of the regulations that both removes many of the
inconsistencies in the language of the regulations found in prior inter-
pretations and better serves the regulatory goals articulated by the
SSA.
Part I of the Note outlines how the SSA processes a disability
claim and illustrates the ambiguity in the language of the reopening
regulations that has caused the split in the courts. Part II examines
the four interpretations of the reopening regulations created by courts.
Part II begins with the Secretary's interpretation and concludes that
this interpretation is plainly inconsistent with the language of the reg-
ulations. Thus, courts need not defer, as they normally would, to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulation. This Part next examines
the alternative interpretations of these regulations advanced by various
courts, and describes how each interpretation fails to reconcile the lan-
guage of these regulations. Barring the possibility of interpreting the
regulations in a way that completely reconciles the language, the vari-
ous goals of the SSA should be considered in choosing the best inter-
pretation. Part III demonstrates that allowing sua sponte reopening in
limited circumstances - under the portion of the regulations that al-
lows reopening forever for, inter alia, fraud and similar fault - best
effectuates the goals of the SSA. Absent fraud or similar fault, how-
ever, the Appeals Council should not initiate reopening, and should
use other procedures to fulfill the policy goals of the SSA.
I. SSA AND THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING REOPENING
The disputed regulations describe how a claimant may pursue a
claim under Title II of the Social Security Act.18 This Part describes
these procedures in detail.
18. Title II of the Social Security Act authorizes the payment of federal old age, survivors,
and disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982). Title II establishes the organiza-
tion of these benefits. It allows the SSA to pay cash benefits to claimants who were wage earners
in the Social Security system and the dependents and the survivors of such claimants. 42 U.S.C.
§ 402 (1982). Title XVI, the Supplemental Security Income ("ss") program, provides analo-
gous benefits to the needy, aged, blind, and disabled regardless of whether they participated in
the Social Security system. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1982). Low-income individuals who are
over age 65, blind, or disabled are eligible. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1982). The hearings and appeals
process for Title XVI claims is analogous to that for Title II claims. Compare 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.1400-.1499 (1988) (adjudication procedure for SSI benefits) with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-
.999 (1988) (adjudication procedure for social security Title II benefits). Medicare benefit claim-
ants use the Title II regulations as well. To adjudicate Medicare benefits, a claimant is directed
to the regulations concerning adjudication under Title II. 42 C.F.R. § 405.701(c) (1988).
This Note is limited to a discussion of Title II benefits. Although the various regulations
provide the same adjudication system for Title XVI benefits and for Medicare benefits, interpret-
ing the regulations reasonably requires some understanding of how the SSA system works and
not just the language of a relevant regulation. Thus, this Note's conclusions concern Title I and
are not necessarily relevant in a Title XVI or Medicare context. However, because courts' analy-
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The initial determination, the first step in adjudicating a claim,
takes place at the state level. 19 Using forms filed by the claimant, a
state examiner determines whether the claimant is disabled within the
meaning of the regulations. 20 Should the initial determination be un-
favorable to the claimant, he has sixty days to fie a written request for
a reconsideration.21 The reconsideration request gives the claimant an
opportunity to file additional information pertinent to his disability
claim.22 If dissatisfied with the outcome of the reconsideration, the
claimant may request a hearing before an ALJ23 within sixty days of
the date he receives notice of the reconsideration decision.24 This is
usually the first opportunity for the claimant to appear personally
before an individual empowered to reach a decision on his claim.25 If,
ses of the reopening issue are based on the text of the regulations, the language of which is
identical, cases involving Medicare and Title XVI can usefully be discussed.
19. Congress directed the Secretary to "make findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights
of any individual applying for payment." 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (1982). The Social Security
Administration contracts with state agencies and empowers them to make disability determina-
tions. R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURrry DISABILITY AND MASS JUSnCE 26 (1973). One reason for
setting up the system this way was that Congress hoped that claimants would take advantage of
state rehabilitation services if they were brought into contact with them. C. MEYER, SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE: THE PROBLEMS OF UNEXPECTED GROWTH 4, 12 (1979).
The state may choose to turn the job of determining disability over to the federal government. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1503 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)(1) (1982). If the SSA can supply the medical data
necessary for a claim determination more easily, it may do so for the state. Also, the SSA sup-
plies important financial information in every claim determination. L. LIEBMAN, DISABILITY
APPEALS IN SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS 5 (1985).
20. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.603, 404.703 (1988). Disability is defined by the regulations as the
"inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected.., to last for a continuous period of not less that
12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (1988).
21. 20 C.F.R. § 404.909(a) (1988). The sixty-day limit may be extended for good cause, 20
C.F.R. § 404.909(b), as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.911 (1988). People other than the disap-
pointed claimant may request reconsideration of a claim. "[A] person who shows in writing that
his or her rights may be adversely affected by the initial determination may request a reconsidera-
tion." 20 C.F.R. § 404.908(a) (1988).
22. R. DIXON, supra note 19, at 32. The reconsideration follows the same procedures as the
initial determination except that a new team renders the decision. Commentary, Adjudication
Process Under US. Social Security Disability Law: Observations and Recommendations, 32
ADMIN. L. REv. 555, 562 (1980). If, however, the claimant has been receiving disability benefits
and has been reevaluated as not disabled, the claimant may have a hearing at the reconsideration
stage. 20 C.F.R. § 404.913(b) (1988).
23. 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (1988). The right to a hearing is guaranteed by the Social Security
Act. 42 U.S.C. 405(b)(1) (1982). While not given the full protection afforded Article III judges,
ALJs are provided some measure of protection from political pressure by the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"). They are hired by the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"), not
the SSA, and "are entitled to pay prescribed by the [OPM] independently of agency recommen-
dations or ratings .... 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1982). An AIJ may be removed only for good cause as
established by the Merit Systems Protection Board. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982). Thus, they are
independent of the SSA in all respects. This independence is jealously guarded by the ALJs. See
infra note 159.
24. 20 C.F.R. § 404.933(b)(1) (1988).
25. Association of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1133 (D.D.C.
1984) ("The AUJ is the first agency personnel in the review process to interview the claimant in
person.").
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after the ALJ issues a decision, the claimant remains dissatisfied, he
has sixty days to file a written request for review by the Appeals
Council.26
The Appeals Council may either grant or deny the claimant's re-
quest for review of an ALJ decision. 27 Should the Appeals Council
choose to review the case, it may issue a decision or remand the claim
to an ALJ for a second hearing. 28 Furthermore, the Appeals Council
has the option of initiating a review on its own motion within sixty
days of the ALJ's decision for any reason.29 In certain situations, the
regulations require the Appeals Council to review a claim. 30 A deci-
26. 20 C.F.R. § 404.968(a)(1) (1988). The Appeals Council is made up of 20 members plus a
chairperson, who is the Associate Commissioner of Hearings and Appeals, and who usually does
not participate in the daily activities of the Council. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the
Apple A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Coun-
cil, in 1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 1987, at 625, 695 (1988) [hereinafter Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple]
These members, unlike AILs, are not protected by the Administrative Procedure Act. Instead,
they are part of the merit pay system and are evaluated mainly on the quality and timeliness of
their work by the Deputy Chair of the Appeals Council. Id. at 697-98 & n.208. These perform-
ance evaluations can affect a member's compensation in a substantial way. Id. at n.208. Some
observers believe that, even without APA protections, Appeals Council members enjoy a high
degree of de facto protection. However, other commentators raise concerns that the Appeals
Council is a "partisan 'arm of the Secretary,'" id. at 699, and that the Council reflects, in subtle
ways, the direction of SSA policymaking by granting fewer or more awards. Id. at 698-99.
27. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1988). The Appeals Council will consider the evidence already in
the record as well as "any new and material evidence submitted ... which relates to the period
on or before the date of the administrative law judge hearing decision." 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.976(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). If it falls within that category, the Appeals Council
may consider it, as well as the AIl record.
28. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1988).
29. HHS regulations provide:
Anytime within 60 days after the date of a hearing decision or dismissal, the Appeals Coun-
cil itself may decide to review the action that was taken. If the Appeals Council does review
the hearing decision or dismissal, notice of the action will be mailed to all parties at their last
known address.
20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1988).
The Appeals Council reviews approximately 10% to 15% of Title II disability cases in which
an ALI has awarded benefits to the claimant. The cases are chosen randomly, picked according
to claimants' Social Security numbers by the malroom clerks in the Office of Disability Opera-
tions ("ODO"). The file is then sent to the Appeals Council for review before the claimant
begins receiving benefits. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple, supra note 26, at 706-
08. These reviews were mandated by the Bellmon Amendments in 1980. Social Security Disabil-
ity Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94 Stat. 441,455-56 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1982)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1392, 1405-06; S. REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
52-56, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1277, 1330-34.
A second kind of own-motion review comes about when the ODO flags a claim. These pro-
test cases fall into three categories: (1) claims in which newly received evidence not available to
the ALJ suggests that the earlier decision was incorrect; (2) claims in which a defect is detected
in the ALJ's medical assessment; or (3) claims in which technical errors are discovered as ODO
begins to calculate the benefit level. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Appl , supra note
26, at 711 n.238.
30. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (1988). The four conditions under which the Appeals Council is
required to review are (1) where there has been an abuse of discretion by an ALJ; (2) where there
has been an error of law; (3) where the conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence; or
(4) where there is a broad policy issue involved which may affect the general public. 20 C.F.R.
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sion of the Appeals Council not to review is final.31 If the claimant is
dissatisfied with the outcome of the Appeals Council review, or if the
request for a review is refused, he may file a complaint within sixty
days in a federal district court.32
The regulations governing these first stages of the hearing process
have not created any confusion. The controversy arises when the Ap-
peals Council does nothing during the sixty-day period in which it has
the authority to review the claim on its own initiative. After the sixty-
day period has passed, the review process is closed, yet the case may
still be reopened.33 A claim may be reopened within twelve months
for any reason,34 within four years for good cause, 35 or at any time in
certain prescribed situations such as fraud or similar fault.36
The ambiguity in the reopening regulations arises from the inter-
§ 404.970 (1988); see Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1986); Razey v. Heckler,
785 F.2d 1426, 1427-29 (9th Cir.) (Section 404.969 gives the Appeals Council discretion to re-
view while § 404.970 mandates four instances where the Appeals Council will review.), modified
on other grounds, rehg. denied, 794 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986).
31. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1988).
32. "The Appeals Council's decision, or the decision of the administrative law judge if the
request for review is denied, is binding unless you... file an action in Federal district court, or
the decision is revised." 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1988).
33. 20 C.F.R. § 404.987 (1988). The regulation states:
Generally, if you are dissatisfied with a determination or decision made in the administrative
review process, but do not request further review within the stated time period, you lose
your right to further review. However, a determination or a decision made in your case may
be reopened and revised. After we reopen your case, we may revise the earlier determina-
tion or decision.
34. "A determination, revised determination, decision, or revised decision may be re-
opened- (a) Within 12 months of the date of the notice of the initial determination, for any
reason .... 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(a) (1988).
35. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(b) (1988). "Good cause" is defined in § 404.989:
(a) We will find that there is good cause to reopen a determination or decision if
(1) New and material evidence is furnished;
(2) A clerical error in the computation or recomputation of benefits was made; or
(3) The evidence that was considered in making the determination or decision clearly
shows on its face that an error was made.
(b) We will not find good cause to reopen your case if the only reason for reopening is a
change of legal interpretation or administrative ruling upon which the determination or
decision was made.
20 C.F.R. § 404.989 (1988).
36. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c) (1988). The regulations provide that a claim may be reopened at
any time if-
(1) It was obtained by fraud or similar fault;
(2) Another person files a claim on the same earnings record and allowance of the claim
adversely affects your claim;
(3) A person previously determined to be dead, and on whose earnings record your entitle-
ment is based, is later found to be alive;
(4) Your claim was denied because you did not prove that the insured person.died, and the
death is later established -
(i) By reason of an unexplained absence from his or her residence for a period of 7 years;
or -
(ii) By location or identification of his or her body;
(5) The Railroad Retirement Board has awarded duplicate benefits on the same earnings
record;
(6) It either -
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play of the three regulations describing how reopening may be initi-
ated. Section 404.987 describes reopening generally and addresses the
claimant directly:
[I]f you are dissatisfied with a determination.., made in the administra-
tive review process, but do not request further review within the stated
time period, you lose your right to further review. However, a determi-
nation... made in your case may be reopened and revised. After we
reopen your case, we may revise the earlier determination or deci-
sion .... You may ask that a determination ... be revised .... The
conditions under which we will reopen a previous determination.., are
explained in section 404.988. 37
Section 404.987 can be read as allowing only the disappointed
claimant to initiate reopening. The section is directed at the claimant
and does not specifically mention that the Appeals Council may initi-
(i) Denies the person on whose earnings record your claim is based gratuitous wage
credits and another Federal agency (other than the Veterans Administration) has errone-
ously certified that is has awarded benefits based on that service; or
(ii) Credits the earnings record of the person on which your claim is based with gratui-
tous wage credits and another Federal agency (other than the Veterans Administration)
certifies that it has awarded a benefit based on the period of service for which the wage
credits were granted;
(7) It finds that the claimant did not have insured status, but earnings were later credited to
his or her earnings record to correct errors apparent on the face of the earnings record ... to
enter items transferred by the Railroad Retirement Board, which were credited under the
Railroad Retirement Act when they should have been credited to the claimant's Social Se-
curity earnings record . . . or to correct errors made in the allocation of wages or self-
employment income to individuals or periods.., which would have given him or her in-
sured status at the time of the determination or decision if the earnings had been credited to
his or her earnings record at that time, and the evidence of these earnings was in our posses-
sion or the possession of the Railroad Retirement Board at the time of the determination or
decision;
(8) It is wholly or partially unfavorable to a party, but only to correct [a] clerical error or an
error that appears on the face of the evidence that was considered when the determination
or decision was made;
(9) It finds that you are entitled to monthly benefits or to a lump sum death payment based
on the earnings of a deceased person, and it is later established that:
(i) You were convicted of a felony or an act in the nature of a felony for intentionally
causing that person's death; or
(ii) If you were subject to the juvenile justice system, you were found by a court of
competent jurisdiction to have intentionally caused that person's death by committing an
act which, if committed by an adult, would have been considered a felony or an act in the
nature of a felony;
(10) It either -
(i) Denies the person on whose earnings record your claim is based deemed wages for
internment during World War II because of an erroneous finding that a benefit based upon
the internment has been determined by an agency of the United States to be payable under
another Federal law or under a system established by that agency; or
(ii) Awards the person on whose earnings record your claim is based deemed wages for
internment during World War II and a benefit based upon the internment is determined by
an agency of the United States to be payable under another Federal law or under a system
established by that agency; or
(11) It is incorrect because -
(i) You were convicted of a crime that affected your right to receive benefits or your
entitlement to a period of disability; or
(ii) Your conviction of a crime that affected your right to receive benefits or your entitle-
ment to a period of disability is overturned.
37. 20 C.F.R. § 404.987 (1988).
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ate reopening when it describes the process to the claimant. Two
courts found the use of the word "however" to be particularly impor-
tant; its use "appears to indicate that the 'may be opened' clause refers
to an action on a motion by 'you,' the claimant. ' 38 Thus, courts could
reasonably interpret the language of the regulation as allowing only
the claimant to initiate reopening.
If ambiguity exists in the regulation that grants the power to reo-
pen, the other regulations concerning reopening do not eliminate the
confusion. Section 404.988 enumerates the conditions for reopening,
but it does not create an independent basis for reopening, and its lan-
guage does not help determine who may initiate proceedings if the
claim satisfies the criteria for reopening. 39 Section 404.989 defines
"good cause," which is a necessary condition for reopening after one
year, but it does not add that the Appeals Council might reopen on its
own initiative.4° None of the three reopening regulations explicitly
mentions that the Appeals Council has the ability to initiate reopening
of a claim. If the Appeals Council has the power to reopen sua sponte,
that power must be inferred from the regulations.
The lack of an explicit grant of authority to reopen takes on added
importance when the regulations concerning reopening are compared
to the regulations governing review. The SSA claims that the Appeals
Council has similar powers to initiate review and reopening. The Ap-
peals Council has the right to initiate own-motion review,41 and the
regulation that gives the Appeals Council this power explicitly names
the Appeals Council as the body that may initiate the review. 42 If the
SSA really intended the two sections to create parallel powers for the
Appeals Council, then it would have used similar language in each of
the two sections.43 The differences in the language of the two sections
suggest that the regulations do not give the Appeals Council identical
powers with respect to review and reopening.
Alternatively, the language of the regulations can be interpreted to
allow the Appeals Council to reopen sua sponte. Although the regula-
tions do not explicitly authorize the Appeals Council to reopen sua
38. McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 169 n.5 (lst Cir. 1987)
(discussing Delong v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1985)). The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Delong, stated that the drafters' choice of "however" was "particularly sug-
gestive that reopening [was] intended to be for the benefit of the disappointed applicant only."
771 F.2d at 268. This was dicta, however, and the court did not decide the issue. 771 F.2d at
268.
39. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.988 (1988); see also supra text accompanying note 37.
40. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.989 (1988).
41. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1988).:
42. Section 404.969 states that "the Appeals Council itself may decide to review the action
[the hearing decision or dismissal] that was taken." 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1988).
43. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.987 (1988) ("You may ask that a determination ... be re-
vised.") with 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1988) ("[T]he Appeals Council itself may decide to review the
action.").
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sponte, neither do they explicitly limit reopening to claimants or pre-
clude reopening by the SSA. In 1980, the Department rewrote the
regulations to address the claimant in the second person in an attempt
to make the regulations easier for claimants to understand.44 As well
as addressing the claimant directly, the SSA's regulations also refer to
the SSA in the first person.45 Thus, the use of "you" in section
404.987 need not indicate a desire by the Department to limit reopen-
ing to claimants, but might be its attempt to tailor the regulations to
the claimant's perspective. This argument makes particular sense be-
cause before 1980, the Appeals Council had the explicit power to re-
open claims sua sponte.46 The SSA emphasizes that the 1980 rewriting
was not intended to make any substantive changes in the regulations;
it was intended only to make them easier for claimants to
understand. 47
Examining the plain meaning of the words of the reopening regula-
tions merely highlights the ambiguity of the language. Both an inter-
pretation allowing only the claimant to reopen and an interpretation
allowing the claimant and the Appeals Council to reopen can be color-
ably inferred from the regulations, and both interpretations create in-
consistencies within the language of the regulations.
II. REOPENING REGULATIONS: FOUR INTERPRETATIONS
Six courts of appeals have directly addressed the issue of whether
the Appeals Council has the power to reopen a claim sua sponte.48
Four different interpretations have been considered at the appellate
level. This section briefly describes the facts and logic of a case that
typifies the reasoning of each of these interpretations, then shows why
each interpretation renders some provision of the regulations moot.
44. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
45. The regulations state that "'[w]e,' 'us,' or 'our' refers to the [SSA]." 20 C.F.R. § 404.901
(1988).
46. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 (1978) ("An initial, revised, or reconsidered determination of
the Administration ... which is otherwise final ... may be reopened .. "); see also Butterworth
v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1379, 1384 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (The Secretary argues that there exists a "long-
standing history" of the reopening regulations under which the Secretary could reopen claims
sua sponte.).
47. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
48. Fox v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1987) (Appeals Council has the ability to reopen
sua sponte); Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Butterworth v. Bowen, 796
F.2d 1379 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (creating a components analysis to decide when the Appeals Council
has the ability to reopen sun sponte); McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 634 F.
Supp. 431 (D.N.H. 1985) (only claimants, and not the Appeals Council, may initiate reopening),
modified, 817 F.2d 161 (1st Cir. 1987); Zimmermann v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1985)
(Appeals Council has the ability to reopen sun sponte); Munsinger v. Schweiker, 709 F.2d 1212
(8th Cir. 1983) (same).
1954 [Vol. 87:1946
Note - Reopening Disability Claims
A. Cieutat: Allowing Sua Sponte Appeals Council Reopening
Four courts of appeals have adopted the Secretary's interpretation
of the reopening regulations and have held that the Appeals Council
may initiate the reopening of a claim.49 In Cieutat v. Bowen,50 the
Appeals Council reopened claimant Cieutat's disability claim and re-
voked a grant of benefits, finding him not disabled.51 The Council
based its reopening of the AL's favorable decision upon a Work Ac-
tivity Report, received after the deadline for review had passed, that
showed that Cieutat had worked for six months as an electrician/
truck driver during the period of his alleged disability.5 2 Cieutat filed
suit challenging this revocation, claiming that the Appeals Council
lacked the authority to reopen his case on its own motion.5 3
The court of appeals began its opinion by noting that its "review of
an agency's regulations is circumscribed."' 54 Because of the deference
due an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, a reviewing
court may reject the interpretation advocated by the Secretary only if
it is "plainly inconsistent with the language of the regulations. 55
Within this limited scope of review, the court accepted the Secretary's
interpretation allowing the Appeals Council, as well as the claimant,
to initiate the reopening process.5 6
The Fifth Circuit rejected Cieutat's argument that allowing the
Appeals Council to reopen within twelve months for any reason and
within four years for good cause renders the sixty-day time limit on
review meaningless.5 7 The Secretary maintained that both procedures
49. These are the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. See
supra note 16.
50. 824 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1987).
51. Cieutat initially filed for SSI disability benefits in 1982 because of a back injury that he
had suffered as the result of a fall at work five years previously. Beginning in 1980, the pain had
worsened to the point where he could sit comfortably for only about ten minutes at a time.
Cieutat had also been treated for depression and addiction to his pain killers. After having his
benefits denied at both the initial determination and the reconsideration stages, an ALI found
him disabled in 1983. 824 F.2d at 350-51.
52. The Work Activity Report had been submitted to the ODO on behalf of Cieutat and the
ODO had sent tl.- SSA a memo informing it of the report. The SSA had also received an em-
ployer report from the company that had employed Cieutat. 824 F.2d at 351.
53. Besides deciding the issue of whether the Appeals Council could reopen sua sponte, the
court also reviewed the record to determine if the Appeals Council had good cause, as defined by
20 C.F.R. § 404.989 (1988), to reopen Cieutat's case. 824 F.2d at 357-58. Seesupra note 35 for a
discussion of good cause.
54. 824 F.2d at 352.
55. 824 F.2d at 352. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the
deference due an agency's interpretation of its own regulation.
56. 824 F.2d at 360.
57. 824 F.2d at 354-56. Section 404.969 limits Appeals Council own-motion review to 60
days after the date of the Appeals Council decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1988). Cieutat argued
that if the Appeals Council may initiate reopening for one year for any reason and for four years
with "good cause," the Council may effectively ignore the 60-day limit on review by simply
"reopening" any claim for which the 60-day limit has expired, effectively using the two proce-
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remain effective because the time periods for the two begin running at
different times. The time period for review begins on the date of the
ALl's decision, while the time period for reopening begins on the date
when the claimant is sent notice of the initial determination.58 With
these different beginning times, a situation could arise in which the
twelve-month limitation on reopening expires before the sixty-day lim-
itation on review; given such a possibility, the separate sixty-day time
limit on review is not inherently superfluous. 59 The court deferred to
the Secretary's interpretation because the Secretary created a hypo-
thetical situation where the reopening regulations did not moot the
review regulations.
In reviewing a regulation, courts supposedly give "great deference"
to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation.60 Although the
dures interchangeably, and rendering the time limit on review moot. See also infra note 64 and
accompanying text.
58. 824 F.2d at 355; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.968(a)(1), 404.988(a), 404.988(b) (1988). The Secre-
tary also observed that the two provisions have distinct subheadings in the regulations and that
while own-motion review is available to only the Appeals Council, any component of the SSA
may reopen a claim. 824 F.2d at 355 n.9. These differences, the Secretary argued, suggest that
reopening and review are two separate and distinct procedures.
59. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
60. 824 F.2d at 352. This general rule, however, is subject to some limitations:
The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some situations may be
relevant in the first instance in choosing between various constructions [of a regulation].
But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). Decided in 1945, Bowles "has
been the unquestioned law ever since." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:22 at
105 (2d ed. 1979).
Thus, in order for an agency's interpretation of a regulation to be upheld, the construction
must (1) comport with the Constitution; (2) comply with the intentions of Congress; and (3) not
be "plainly inconsistent" with the language of the regulation. The only constitutional challenge
to these regulations was the due process argument raised by the First Circuit, which is refuted in
this Note. See infra Part II.B.1. There is no question that these regulations fulfill congressional
intent. Congress vested the Secretary with broad powers, "on his own motion, to hold such
hearings and to conduct such investigations and other proceedings as he may deem necessary or
proper for administration of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (1982). Furthermore, he
"is authorized to delegate to any member, officer, or employee ... any of the powers conferred
upon him by this section .... " 42 U.S.C. § 405(1) (1982). The remaining criterion, then, is to
test whether the interpretation is plainly inconsistent with the language of the regulation,
Confusion exists over the degree of deference that courts actually give to administrative inter-
pretations. The test is not uniformly applied or interpreted. The Supreme Court applies the rule
only when it is convenient; otherwise, the Court ignores it. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of
Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587, 591-95 (1984) [here-
inafter Weaver, The Deference Rule].
When courts defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation, the
courts often explain the deference in terms of the agency's expertise. In areas where the agency
genuinely has a special expertise, this deference is justified; the agency has a better grasp of both
the issue and the ramifications within the agency of different interpretations. See Donovan v. A.
Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 61, 63-64 (Ist Cir. 1985); Southern Mutual Help Assn. v.
Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally K. DAVIS, supra, at § 7:22; Weaver,
Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 726
(1984). However, there are competing considerations. In some cases, although an agency may
have more complete knowledge concerning the regulation, its interpretation may also have a
greater likelihood of being influenced by considerations outside the legitimate realm of the regu-
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standard can be enunciated in several ways, 61 the meaning of the rule
remains the same: when a court finds the language of a regulation
ambiguous, it must accept the agency's interpretation unless that in-
terpretation is plainly inconsistent with the wording of the regulations.
A reviewing court cannot replace an agency's interpretation of a regu-
lation with one of its own simply because its interpretation appears
more plausible than the agency's.62 If an agency's interpretation is
reasonable, it must be accepted by a reviewing court.63 By holding
that the SSA's interpretation is not plainly inconsistent with the lan-
guage of the regulations and that a situation could exist where the
review regulations would apply while the reopening regulations would
not, the court was bound to accept the Secretary's interpretation. A
closer examination of the regulatory framework as a whole, however,
suggests that the Secretary's argument is not particularly persuasive,
and that allowing sua sponte reopening does indeed render the review
regulations moot.
1. The Reopening and Review Regulations Overlap in Time
The Secretary claims that reopening and review are separate and
distinct procedures not only because the time limitation on reopening
could expire before the limitation on review, but also because the time
limitations for the two provisions begin to run at different points in the
appeals process. The time limit for Appeals Council review begins to
run on the date of the AL's decision, while the time period for re-
opening begins running when the SSA notifies the claimant of the ini-
tial determination."4 The Secretary hypothesizes that claims may arise
where the one-year limitation on reopening for any reason has expired
while the sixty-day limit on Appeals Council review has not.65 Thus,
lation. Weaver, The Deference Rule, supra, at 612-13. Some commentators believe that courts
have lost faith in the SSA and no longer defer to its regulatory interpretation for this reason. See
Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple, supra note 26, at 786-87. Another reason courts
need not defer to the SSA in this instance is that these regulations control how claims will be
adjudicated and how to deal with questions of law and fact - an area with which courts are
more familiar than is the SSA. See, eg., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commn., 578 F.2d 289, 292-93 (10th Cir. 1978).
61. The Supreme Court has also phrased the test as whether the "interpretation is supported
by the wording of the regulations and is consistent with prior agency decisions." Northern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, 423 U.S. 12 (1975) (per
curiam).
62. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977). Although the regulations in Lario-
noffcontained several ambiguities, the Court held that it "need not tarry ... over the various
ambiguous terms and complex interrelations of the regulations." 431 U.S. at 872. The Court
proceeded to give a cursory analysis, upholding the government's interpretation.
63. Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 872.
64. Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 1987). Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.969
(1988) with 20 C.F.R. § 404.988 (1988).
65. The Secretary hypothesizes a case where
a claimant received an initial determination denying him benefits ... on January 1, 1987.
This determination triggers the limitations periods on the SSA's ability to reopen the case
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the review regulation could be used in instances where the reopening
regulation could not be, and therefore is not unnecessary.
While this situation could possibly arise, that possibility does not
alleviate the tension between these two sections. The conflict remains,
in part because the hypothesized difference is illusory - situations
where this would occur are almost nonexistent - and in part because
the Appeals Council can reopen a claim for good cause for four years.
The criteria for good-cause reopening also overlap with the criteria for
review. Sua sponte reopening for good cause may be used to moot the
sixty-day limitation on review as easily as the one-year limitation on
reopening without cause. Even the Secretary has not suggested that
the four-year period for reopening with good cause might run before
the sixty-day period for review. The likelihood that the one-year limit
for reopening without cause might expire before the sixty-day period
for review is remote, though not entirely implausible; it is simply infea-
sible, however, that the four-year period for good-cause reopening
might expire before the sixty-day period for review.
2. The Reopening and Review Regulations Serve an Identical
Purpose Within the SSA
The reopening regulations also render the sixty-day limitation on
review moot because the Appeals Council may reopen a claim for the
same reasons that the Appeals Council must review a claim. Cer-
tainly, reopening for "any reason" overlaps with the four enumerated
instances where the Appeals Council must review. Reopening for four
years for "good cause" also overlaps to some extent with the review
regulations: both allow the Appeals Council to act for errors of law.
The sixty-day limit on review is circumvented because reopening
sua sponte, so that the Appeals Council (or, presumably the AL]) may reopen without cause
through January 1, 1988 and with cause through January 1, 1991. In the meantime, since
the claimant was denied benefits, he will probably seek reconsideration. Assuming he waits
until the end of the sixty-day period that he has to do so, and that reconsideration occurs
within thirty days after that, the claimant may be expected to receive notice of the agency's
decision upon reconsideration on about April 1, 1987. The claimant then has another sixty
days within which to request a hearing before an AL. Assuming he makes such a request
sixty days after receiving notice of the state agency's decision upon reconsideration, the SSA
would get the request on about June 1, 1987. If the hearing before the ALJ is held six
months later, and the AL issues his decision only a month after the hearing, the AL's
hearing decision could be expected to be released by January 1, 1988. From that date, the
Appeals Council has sixty days, until approximately March 1, 1988, to review the case on its
own motion. Thus, under this hypothetical scenario, the Appeals Council could reopen
without cause only through January 1, 1988, but could initiate review through March 1,
1988.
Cieutat, 824 F.2d at 355 n.l1 (emphasis in original). However, in 1978, the mean processing
time for a two-person review team was 45 days. Commentary, supra note 22, at 562. The recon-
sideration procedure is identical to that for the initial determination. Id. For review by an AUJ,
a claimant must wait, on average, 248 days from the day she files the request until the day the
AJ issues a decision. Id. at 564. Finally, the average length of time for Appeals Council review
is 108 days. Id. An average claim takes more than 350 days to go through the four adjudicative
levels. Id. at 565.
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serves the same function, but the regulations do not limit it to sixty
days.
The Secretary insisted in Cieutat that, aside from having different
invocation requirements, the two provisions are different because they
serve separate functions within the adjudicatory process. 66 If this is
true, then the reopening regulations do not render the review regula-
tion moot even though they serve no distinct purpose from a claim-
ant's viewpoint. These separate functions are illustrated, according to
the SSA, by the way the regulations are organized. The SSA uses the
fact that the reopening and review regulations are found under differ-
ent headings in the Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR") to illustrate
the difference between the two processes. 67 The review regulations fol-
low chronologically within the other four steps of adjudication of a
claim.68 The reopening regulations, however, are located in the regu-
lations after the entire adjudicatory process has been described, sug-
gesting that it is not a normal step in adjudication, but an
extraordinary one.69 The SSA points to their different locations in the
CFR as evidence that reopening and review are not designed to ac-
complish the same goals.70 This argument convinced the Fifth Circuit
that there are hypothetical cases where reopening and review do not
overlap completely. However, closer scrutiny of this argument reveals
its flaws.
The argument that the two measures serve different functions
might be plausible if the Appeals Council reopened claims under dif-
ferent criteria than it reviewed claims. But the agency has admitted
that the criteria it uses to reopen "for any reason," whether initiated
by the claimant or the Appeals Council, are the very ones enumerated
in section 404.970, the regulation that outlines the criteria for
mandatory own-motion review. 71 During the first year following an
initial determination date, the SSA mandates that the Appeals Council
reopen a claim using the review standards. Thus, the two procedures
are used in the same, not separate, situations.
The Secretary emphasizes that review and reopening of claims
were created to play different roles in the appeals process. 72 The re-
view process allows the Appeals Council to ensure consistency among
ALJs. 73 In 1980, the SSA instituted a program for randomly review-
66. Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 348, 354-56 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Butterworth v. Bowen,
796 F.2d 1379, 1384 (1lth Cir. 1986).
67. Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-.970 (1988) with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989 (1988).
68. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-.983 (1988).
69. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989 (1988).
70. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161
(Ist Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1732).
71. McCuin, 817 F.2d at 170 n.6.
72. Butterworth v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (11th Cir. 1986).
73. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
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ing ALJ decisions for consistency. 74 Ten to fifteen percent of ALJ
decisions are now reviewed as a matter of course to promote uniform-
ity among ALJs. 75 In contrast with reviewing, the Secretary considers
reopening to be an extraordinary measure, 76 available only under more
stringent procedural safeguards. 77 The SSA's internal manual defines
reopening as giving the SSA a chance "to take another look."' 78 This
second look occurs when extraordinary factors arise more than sixty
days after the ALJ's decision.
Apparently, however, even the Appeals Council confuses the two
measures. In Butterworth v. Bowen, the decision of the Appeals Coun-
cil began with the statement that "[tihis case is before the Appeals
Council on its own motion to review the decision of the administrative
law judge,"' 79 when, in fact, the Appeals Council had reopened the
claim (the time for review had expired). The cover page of the Ap-
peals Council's decision was also marked "Bellmon case."' 80 This was
a reference to the Bellmon Amendments, which provided a statutory
mandate requiring the SSA to create a review procedure to begin over-
seeing ALl decisions to increase uniformity.81 In Butterworth, the Ap-
peals Council thought it was reviewing when, in fact, the time limit for
own-motion review had expired. Moreover, the Appeals Council ad-
mits that it has, in the past, used the reopening provisions to review
claims in situations where the sixty-day limit for own-motion review
has passed. 82 When the Appeals Council uses the two different provi-
sions interchangeably, the argument that they serve different functions
has little credibility.
B. McCuin: Sua Sponte Appeals Council Reopening
Violates Due Process
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in McCuin v. Secretary
74. SOCIAL SECURITY RULINGS 64 (Cum. ed. 1982).
75. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
76. Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 348, 355 n.9 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1238 (1Ith Cir. 1983) ("reopening of a case is an extraordinary measure").
77. As the regulatory time period for reopening grows longer, the criteria for reopening grow
more stringent. The Appeals Council may review a claim for any reason within 60 days. 20
C.F.R. § 404.969 (1988). The Secretary insists that he reopens claims "for any reason" under
section 404.988(a) only if the claims satisfy the conditions of section 404.970, which defines the
conditions for review. McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 171 n.6.
(1st Cir. 1987). After the first year, the Secretary may reopen only if he has "good cause," 20
C.F.R. § 404.988(b) (1988), and after four years he may reopen only if he can fulfill one of the
specified criteria. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c) (1988).
78. Fox v. Heckler, [Social Security Transfer Binder 29] Unempl. Ins. Rep. 116,958 (N.D.
Ohio 1986) (quoting the Department's internal manual, the Program Operation Manual System).
79. Butterworth, 796 F.2d at 1382.
80. 796 F.2d at 1389 n.9.
81. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(c), 94 Stat.
455 (1980).
82. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple. supra note 26, at 724 n.268.
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of Health and Human Services, 83 disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's
determination that the Secretary's interpretation is consistent with the
language of the regulations. It held instead that "no reading... would
not stretch the language of the regulations to a considerable extent." 84
The court rejected the Secretary's interpretation on a theory not raised
in the Cieutat case, holding that sua sponte Appeals Council reopening
violated claimants' due process rights.85
McCuin sought reimbursement from Medicare for hospital ex-
penses.86 After an ALJ decision granted her benefits, the Appeals
Council reopened and revised a portion of the decision.87 McCuin
brought suit solely on the issue of the propriety of the Appeals Coun-
cil's sua sponte reopening. 88
The district court found that the Secretary's interpretation violated
the claimant's due process rights. 89 The court of appeals agreed, hold-
ing that "[t]he reopening power claimed by the Secretary takes away
83. 817 F.2d 161 (Ist Cir. 1987).
84. 817 F.2d at 171 (emphasis in original).
85. Cieutat did not make a due process argument, thus the Fifth Circuit did not address
whether the fourteenth amendment's due process clause might restrict reopening by the Appeals
Council. Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 348, 356 n.12 (5th Cir. 1987).
86. At the first hearing, the AL decided against McCuin. She sought Appeals Council re-
view and the Appeals Council remanded the claim. The second AUI decision granted McCuin
coverage for the hospital bills and waived her liability for the cost of the services not covered by
Medicare. 817 F.2d at 163. In McCuin's case, when the Appeals Council reversed the AL's
decision, she became liable for paying the uncovered bill because what was reversed was a waiver
of liability. In a Title II case, this situation would not arise. Claimants either stop getting the
benefits or, in extreme cases, may be required to repay past overpayments. Once the Appeals
Council reopens a claim and denies previously granted benefits, those benefits are considered
overpayments - "a payment in excess of the amount due under Title II." 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.501(a) (1988). The claimant must repay those benefits only in limited circumstances. As
long as the individual is "without fault" and the adjustment would defeat the purpose of Title II
or be against "equity and good conscience," the claimant will not be required to repay the SSA.
20 C.F.R. § 404.506 (1988).
The SSA defines fault as:
(a) An incorrect statement made by the individual which he knew or should have known
to be incorrect; or
(b) Failure to furnish information which he knew or should have known to be material; or
(c) With respect to the overpaid individual only, acceptance of a payment which he either
knew or could have been expected to know was incorrect.
20 C.F.R. § 404.507 (1988). Thus, unless the Appeals Council is reopening because of fraud or
similar fault on the part of the claimant under section 404.988(c), the SSA would not request that
the claimant repay the money. It is probably not the claimant's "fault" unless he has committed
some type of fraud on the SSA.
87. The Appeals Council reopened the claim eight months after the second AUl decision. It
revised the portion of the decision dealing with the waiver of liability for the uncovered services,
holding that the ALJ had committed an error of law. 817 F.2d at 163.
88. In other parts of its ruling, the court rejected the Secretary's claim that the court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case, 817 F.2d at 163-66, and remanded the claim to the district court so
that the suit could be certified as a class action. 817 F.2d at 166-67.
89. "The reopening ... deprived [the claimant] of fair notice of the Secretary's intentions,
stripped away the protective cloak of due process, and destroyed the surety which a final, binding
decision should guarantee." McCuin v. Bowen, 634 F. Supp. 431, 433 (D.N.H. 1985) (quoting
Dion v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., Civil No. 83-442-D at 4 (D.N.H. Apr. 25, 1984)).
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the finality that adjudication normally affords." 90 In reaching this
conclusion, the court acknowledged that little precedent existed to
support this argument.91 Despite the lack of support, the court held
that reopening by the Appeals Council violated substantive due pro-
cess-because it deprived a claimant of finality.92 The court reasoned
that if the Appeals Council were allowed to reopen sua sponte for a
four-year period, a claimant could not rely upon the decision until that
four-year period had ended. At any time before then, a claimant's
"favorable" decision could be reopened and changed to an "unfavora-
ble" decision. A favorable outcome would be tenuous, dependent
upon the Appeals Council's decision not to reopen. 93
The First Circuit's analysis depended upon the substantive due
process problem of finality "spawning" a procedural due process prob-
lem of lack of fair notice.94 The court held that the notice sent by the
SSA to successful claimants does not adequately inform them of the
possibility that the Appeals Council may reopen their claims.95 The
SSA could not tell the claimant it was "awarding" benefits because
there was no finality and the benefits might be taken away at any time.
Furthermore, the court held that the regulations make it impossible to
formulate a notice that adequately describes the claimant's position
without highlighting the total absurdity of the situation; to satisfy the
notice requirement, the Appeals Council would have to announce that
it had made a decision, but simultaneously announce that it could
change its mind within four years. 96 The court believed that an accu-
rate notice would read:
The Appeals Council reserves the right to reopen your case within a year
for any reason and within four years for good cause. "Good cause" in-
cludes errors of fact or law that we may have made in processing your
claim. You should be aware that if we discover that we made such an
error, the benefits we grant you today will be taken away from you at
that time.9 7
90. McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 172 (1st Cir. 1987).
91. McCuin contended that the reason for the lack of precedent for her due process challenge
was that "finality of judgment is basic to every adjudicatory system and is seldom, if ever, cir-
cumvented in this way." 817 F.2d at 172. The court started with the presumption that finality is
a basic precept to adjudication. It then adapted this principle to the administrative context,
analogizing to other instances where the Supreme Court has drawn from common law principles
and applied them to administrative proceedings. 817 F.2d at 172-73.
92. 817 F.2d at 174.
93. 817 F.2d at 172.
94. 817 F.2d at 172.
95. See infra note 99. The formulation of the notice is misleading for several reasons. It does
not resolve the question of who may reopen a claim, and it also omits the fact that the claimant
may initiate reopening. 817 F.2d at 173.
96. The court concluded that no other tribunal would allow such a notice to be sent. Mc.
Cuin, 817 F.2d at 173.
97. McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 173 (1st Cir. 1987).
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However, although an accurate notice could be formulated, it does not
eliminate the finality problem.
1. Sua Sponte Reopening Does Not Violate Due Process
Because disability benefits are protected property interests within
the meaning of the fifth amendment, 98 the SSA must fulfill certain re-
quirements defined by the due process clause of the Constitution
before it can deprive a claimant of benefits previously awarded. The
First Circuit's due process objection rests primarily on the lack of fi-
nality sua sponte reopening affords the claimant. The court appears to
demand a level of finality comparable to the level found in a court
proceeding. But because the Constitution does not require an admin-
istrative agency to provide the same degree of finality as a court
proceeding, the constitutional impediments to the Secretary's interpre-
tation are more illusory that real.
The SSA does not provide the same level of finality to claimants as
a court provides to litigants, and it is not required to do so. Finality,
as embodied in the concept of res judicata, is a "fundamental precept
of common law adjudication" 99 which applies to both administrative
and judicial proceedings. 100 However, it applies to administrative pro-
ceedings only in a modified form. 101 An agency may create proceed-
98. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (The Secretary "recognizes, as has been
implicit in our prior decisions, that the interest of an individual in continued receipt of [Social
Security disability] benefits is a statutorily created 'property' interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment.") (citations omitted).
99. McCuin, 817 F.2d at 172 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)).
As the McCuin court acknowledged, finality is not often discussed explicitly in cases. Instead,
discussion often revolves around the applicability of res judicata.
Res judicata and finality are not the same principle. Resjudicata is a much broader principle,
and reasons other than finality, such as trying to achieve judicial economy and to avoid inconsis-
tent results, exist and account for the application of res judicata to a particular situation. 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
§ 4403 (1981). However, the main reason to apply res judicata to a decision is to create a final
decision. This is because "[the deepest interest underlying the conclusive effect of prior adjudi-
cation draws from the purpose to provide a means of finally ending private disputes." Id. at 15.
In many cases, then, res judicata can be used as an effective tool to examine finality.
100. "[A] valid and final adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal has the
same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a
judgment of a court." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(1) (1982). Note, however,
that for this to be true, the determination must have all the essential elements of adjudication:
adequate notice, the right to present evidence and the opportunity to rebut it, a statement of the
issues of law and fact, and a rule of finality. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2)
(1982). The less an adjudication looks like a court proceeding, the less the need for finality
governs. In the adjudication of SSA disability claims, res judicata applies because of a statutory
mandate, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1982), despite the differences between a court proceeding and a
disability hearing. See 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 60, at § 21:3. Indeed, the fact that res judicata
applies does not mean a high degree of finality is necessary. The differences between the court
system and an SSA hearing still counsel against requiring the same level of finality of each.
101. See Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 1975). The law is confused about
when res judicata could and should apply to administrative proceedings. See 4 K. DAVIS, supra
note 60, at § 21:3.
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ings in which the degree of finality does not equal that attained in the
court system.102 The purposes for a strict rule of finality are less im-
portant in an administrative setting than in a trial-like setting. 103 The
less like a trial a hearing looks, the less the need for a high level of
finality. The purposes and procedures of an AD hearing and a judi-
cial proceeding are very different. Because of these differences, the
SSA can provide claimants with a lower level of finality and still not
violate their due process rights.
The different purposes of a trial and an SSA hearing lead to the
different needs for finality.104 The court system provides a forum for
dispute resolution. It gives private citizens a way to settle their differ-
ences in a fair manner. Unlike the court system, the SSA hearing
provides the place for the "systematic and affirmative implementation
of certain prescribed legislative policies."10 The SSA uses its hearing
process to ensure that it pays benefits to qualified claimants. It is not a
question of one party being more "correct" than another. Instead,
claimants are either disabled, which qualifies them for benefits, or not
disabled, in which case they do not get benefits. "The adjudication of
claims in social welfare programs is an outgrowth of a positive legisla-
tive program to insure or protect qualified claimants against certain
economic hazards."10 6 Furthermore, parties to a trial have the option
of resolving their disputes privately, outside the court system, through
methods such as negotiation or arbitration. In contrast, claimants
lack the option of going outside the adjudication system set up by the
SSA. In order to get benefits, a claimant must file with the SSA and
use its procedures.
The different procedures of a trial and a disability hearing reflect
the different purposes of the two proceedings. The court system is
adversarial. In its ideal form, two adversaries vie to win a dispute,
with the truth becoming evident as the proceeding progresses. 107 Sim-
102. It appears that the Court allows an administrative agency wide latitude in satisfying due
process requirements. "IT]he Court seems to have adopted a posture for due process review that
asks in broad terms whether challenged procedures represent a responsible attempt by the agency
... to preserve the values of accuracy, fairness, and timeliness, given the social and economic
context within which those procedures operate." J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W.
SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 10
(1978) [hereinafter HEARINGS AND APPEALS].
103. See e.g., C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 99, at 15 ("The central role
of adversary litigation in our society is to provide binding answers.") (emphasis added).
104. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes
on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
105. Id. at 780.
106. Id. at 779. Mashaw argues that one reflection of the "affirmative implementation" of
the legislative policies is the fact that the hearings are nonadversarial and informal. Id. at 780.
107. "The object of a lawsuit is to get at the truth and arrive at the right result. This is the
sole objective of the judge ...." Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1035 (1975) (quoting D. PECK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT AND COUNSEL 9
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ilarly, in a disability hearing, the presiding adjudicator (an ALJ) is
concerned principally with discovering the truth; he uses the hearing
as a forum to gather enough information to make an informed deci-
sion concerning the claimant's disability claim. An ALJ, unlike a
judge, however, must do more than act as a passive adjudicator mak-
ing a decision based upon the information presented to him; the ALJ
has an affirmative duty to bring out information regardless of whom it
favors. 108 Disability hearings are inquisitorial, not adversarial. The
SSA is not pitted against the claimant,10 9 for no one represents the
SSA at ALJ hearings.110 In fact, in many cases, no one represents the
claimant either.1 '
Furthermore, a disability claim determination is not final in the
same sense as a court judgment, even apart from possible reopening.
As a claimant's condition changes, so does his ability to receive dis-
ability benefits. Continuing disability reviews are scheduled on a regu-
lar basis to ensure that claimants on the disability rolls remain
"disabled" and that their conditions have not changed. 112 Although
termination decisions are final in the respect that the decision of the
(1954) (13th Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture)). "Whether or not the judge generally
achieves or maintains neutrality, it is his assigned task to be nonpartisan and to promote through
the trial an objective search for the truth." Id. at 1035.
108. Many commentators have said that AL~s wear "three hats" when referring to their
multifaceted role in a hearing. An ALT described his three roles:
We put on the first hat, and we represent the claimant, we present all the testimony on his
behalf, and drag it out of him by questioning. We then represent the government, the Social
Security Administration, and search the law - that's the second hat. We search our minds,
and we search whatever other records are available, we search the evidence, and we present
the best case the government has. Then we turn around and put on the third hat, and we
decide which evidence is the most favorable, and in whose behalf.
Popkin, The Effect of Representation in Nonadveriary Proceedings - A Study of Three Disability
Programs, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 991-92 (1977) (quoting Rausch v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 4,
6 (E.D. Wis. 1967)); see also R. DIXON, supra note 19, at 37. The ALJ has an affirmative duty to
bring out information regardless of whom it favors. H. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS
AND PROCEDURES § 566 (3d ed. 1989 Supp.) ("An Administrative Law Judge ... has [a] duty to
elicit both favorable and unfavorable facts and circumstances.").
109. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple, supra note 26, at 670 n.128.
110. See supra note 108.
111. ALJs have a special responsibility to help an unrepresented claimant. Heckler v. Camp-
bell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). In recent years, representation by coun-
sel has increased in frequency. Davis reported that claimants were unrepresented at more than
70% of the ALU hearings. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 100, at § 21:3. In 1986, 64% of the claimants
had legal representation, while 16% had nonlegal representation. Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1986)
(Statement of F. Smith, Assoc. Commr. for Hearings and Appeals, SSA) [hereinafter Ways and
Means Hearings 1986].
112. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1588-.1599 (1988). The SSA must evaluate a disabled claimant
from "time to time" to determine if the claimant is still disabled. This evaluation is called a
"continuing disability review" ("CDR"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1589 (1988). The frequency of the
reviews depends upon the type of disability. If the impairment is expected to improve, review
will occur within six to 18 months after the latest decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1590(d) (1988). If
the duration of the disability cannot be estimated, review will occur at least once every three
years, and if a claimant is diagnosed as permanently disabled, reviews will take place every five to
seven years. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1590(d) (1988).
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SSA does not change, a claimant cannot "rely" upon benefits continu-
ing because he cannot, in many cases, rely upon his disability
continuing.11 3
Thus an ALJ decision, even if it is susceptible to sua sponte Ap-
peals Council reopening, does afford a claimant an adequate measure
of finality. This eliminates both of the due process problems noted by
the First Circuit. Without a finality problem, no notice problem is
"spawned." Claimants receive adequate notice of their situation. The
form that informs claimants of a favorable decision states:
The Appeals Council, may, on its own motion, within 60 days from the
date shown below, review the decision, which could possibly result in a
change in the decision (20 CFR 404.969 and 416.1469). After the sixty-
day period, the Appeals Council generally may only reopen and revise
the decision on the basis of new and material evidence, or if a clerical
error has been made as to the amount of the benefits or where there is an
error as to the decision on the face of the evidence on which it is based
(20 CFR 404.988; 42 CFR 405.750 and 405.1570). If the Appeals Coun-
cil decides to review the enclosed decision on its own motion or to re-
open and revise it, you will be notified accordingly. 114
Thus, under the SSA's own regulations, the claimant knows of the
possibility of reopening and the conditions under which SSA usually
reopens. As further notice, when the Appeals Council reopens the
claim, it sends a notice to the claimant stating that the claim is being
reopened, and that the claimant may present new evidence and request
a hearing. 115
The due process protections afforded claimants - even if the Ap-
peals Council reopens sua sponte - comport with the standards for
evaluating due process established by the Supreme Court. Mathews v.
Eldridge 116 is the paradigm for analyzing whether the procedural pro-
tections given to a claimant comport with due process. In Mathews,
the Court created a three-pronged balancing test for determining when
procedural protections are adequate. A reviewing court must weigh:
[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2] the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
113. Termination proceedings differ drastically from reopening. When the SSA terminates a
claimant after a continuing disability review ("CDR"), his condition has changed. Usually, how-
ever, the condition of the claimant has not changed in the time between the AIJ decision and the
Appeals Council reopening. Yet, the two procedures demonstrate the sharp distinction between
the finality of the court system and the finality afforded a disability claimant. Even if a tort
victim's condition improves dramatically more than predicted in court, the victim need not re-
turn part of his judgment. The damages represent a final award; no change in condition will
necessitate returning the money. The difference in finality can be explained by the difference in
the two systems. Disability benefits are inextricably linked to a claimant's condition. In that
sense, they are never final like a court judgment.
114. McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 173 (1st Cir. 1987)
(quoting Appeals Council Notice) (emphasis in original).
115. 20 C.F.R. § 404.992(b) (1988); Fox v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1987).
116. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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used and the probable value ... of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and [3] the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 117
In Mathews, the Court held that an agency does not have to hold an
evidentiary hearing as a prerequisite to the termination of disability
benefits. Mathews demonstrates that an administrative process need
not parallel the process demanded of the court system by the fifth
amendment if, when viewed functionally, the procedures are
reasonable.""8
The SSA's procedures afford claimants a level of finality; claimants
do not receive the same degree of finality that accompanies a court's
decision, but they do receive enough to pass constitutional muster.
The uncertainty that claimants feel because of the possibility of Ap-
peals Council reopening lasts a maximum of four years, after which
the Appeals Council may reopen only for conditions such as fraud or
similar fault. Furthermore, the notice sent to claimants adequately
informs them of the possibility of sua sponte reopening. Hence, no due
process problems exist.
2. The McCuin Court's Interpretation Renders Part of the
Regulations Meaningless
The due process clause does not require a court to adopt an inter-
pretation allowing only claimants to reopen. Once the constitutional
mandate is eliminated, this interpretation can be rejected because it
renders a provision of the regulations meaningless. Although allowing
only claimants to utilize the reopening procedure avoids a conflict be-
tween the reopening and the review regulations,1 19 it deprives another
of the reopening regulations of any content. Section 404.988(c) allows
reopening, at any time, in situations where a decisionmaker finds
"fraud or similar fault." 120 Most of the criteria in this section deal
117. 424 U.S. at 335.
118. In applying the balancing test, the Mathews Court described the plaintiff's interest as
the interest in uninterrupted benefits. If he ultimately prevails, his benefits are awarded retroac-
tively and he will not lose any money. Because disability claims are not based upon need, tempo-
rary interruption of payments does not, at least in theory, harm the plaintiff. The Court then
considered the "fairness and reliability" of the procedures. It looked at the process to see the risk
of error inherent in the truth-finding process. In Mathews, the potential risk of error was not
great, and because the decision in a disability case turns on "routine, standard and unbiased
medical reports," an oral presentation is not measurably better than a written submission. Fi-
nally, the Court examined the increased costs and additional burdens associated with requiring a
pretermination hearing. These costs would not be "insubstantial," and when coupled with the
knowledge that judicial-type proceedings are not necessary to ensure fairness, counsel against
imposing pretermination hearings as a requirement. In short, as long as the parties can present a
"meaningful case," the procedures comply with the due process clause.
119. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Under this interpretation, because the
Appeals Council may initiate review, but not reopening, the reopening regulations do not moot
the review regulations.
120. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c) (1988).
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with benefits wrongfully obtained, not wrongfully denied. No claim-
ant would invoke these provisions in order to reopen a claim; such a
reopening would only lead to having his benefits taken away. Only the
SSA or a second claimant to the same benefits would utilize these pro-
visions. z12 Thus, the "claimant only" interpretation renders those por-
tions effectively meaningless and is inconsistent with the language of
the regulations.
C. Butterworth: The "Components Analysis"
Like Cieutat and McCuin, Butterworth v. Bowen 122 involved a
claim in which the Appeals Council reopened sua sponte an ALJ deci-
sion favorable to the claimant.123 Unlike the other two courts, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not adopt a
position advocated by either party to the suit. Instead, it adopted an
approach to reopening which it considered "the only alternative con-
sistent with the overall regulatory framework."' 24
Mindful of the deferential standard of review accorded to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations, the court first decided
that the Secretary's interpretation of sections 404.987 and 404.988 is
reasonable and that the two sections "establish conditions under
which the Secretary as well as the claimant is authorized to initiate the
reopening of a case."' 25 However, the court held that in order to reo-
pen a claim, the SSA must satisfy a second condition. In addition to
meeting the criteria of section 404.988, the case must be properly
before that particular "component level."' 26 The court found that a
case is properly before the Appeals Council when it has taken jurisdic-
tion by reviewing the claim, either on own-motion review or at the
request of the claimant. Because the Appeals Council did not exercise
its option to review Butterworth's claim within sixty days, and because
Butterworth did not appeal the decision of the ALJ, the Council did
not have the jurisdiction to reopen his claim on its own initiative.
Only the ALJ could have reopened the claim; only the ALJ had juris-
121. The reasons for allowing reopening are events such as fraud on the SSA. One claimant
tried to explain these regulations as provisions to allow people other than the claimant who have
an interest in the benefits to reopen. Under other provisions if multiple claimants apply for the
same fixed amount of benefits, the benefits to each individual claimant may be decreased. Mc-
Cuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 170 (1st Cir. 1987). There may be
situations where this hypothetical arises, but even the First Circuit admits that this strains the
language of the regulation. 817 F.2d at 170.
122. 796 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1986).
123. Butterworth suffered from emphysema. His claim was denied, both in the initial deter-
mination and the reconsideration that followed. An AD found Butterworth disabled, holding
that he could no longer work at his old job. Six months later, the Appeals Council sent But-
terworth a letter telling him it was reopening his claim. 796 F.2d at 1380-82.
124. 796 F.2d at 1389.
125. 796 F.2d at 1385.
126. 796 F.2d at 1386-89.
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diction over the claim at that time.127
1. The "Components Analysis" Creates Artificial Distinctions
The components analysis, although reconciling the reopening and
review regulations, relies upon distinctions not articulated in the regu-
lations.1 28 It analogizes to the court system to determine when the
Appeals Council may initiate reopening. The Butterworth court held
that the Appeals Council must first have jurisdiction over a claim,
much in the same way that a court must have jurisdiction over a case.
But analogizing to the judicial system, while tempting, is not always
appropriate. 129 As Justice Frankfurter wisely noted, administrative
agencies have a different origin and function than do courts, and this
difference "preclude[s] wholesale transplantation of the rules of proce-
dure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history and expe-
rience of courts. ' 130 The purpose and implementation of legislative
policy in disability hearings is different from that of the court sys-
tem. 131 The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation is deficient because it re-
lies upon distinctions which, although relevant in a judicial context,
simply do not exist in the regulations.
D. The Errors Of Fact/Errors of Law Distinction
The final interpretation, although accepted by several district
courts, has not been accepted by any court of appeals. As articulated
by the district courts, this fourth interpretation differentiates between
errors of law and errors of fact. In Fox v. Heckler, 132 Fox applied for
127. 796 F.2d at 1388-89.
128. McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 171 (1st Cir. 1987) (The
Butterworth interpretation, "while ingenious, suffers from the defect of relying on many detailed
distinctions of which the regulations make no mention.").
129. Judge Friendly has observed that despite many commentators' grave reservations,
Americans have "gone mad" in their tendency to judicialize administrative procedure. Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (1975). Judge Friendly agrees with
Professor Davis' comment that "[t]he best answer to the overall question of whether we want
more judicialization or less is probably that we need more in some contexts and less in other
contexts." Id. at 1270 (footnote omitted).
130. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940).
131. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
132. [Social Security Transfer Binder 29] Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 16,458 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 15, 1986), revd. sub nom. Fox v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1987). This interpretation
of the regulations has been espoused in two other district court cases. In Russell v. Califano,
[1979 Social Security Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 16,227 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19,
1978), the court held that the Appeals Council did not have the power to reopen the claim.
Because the status of an illegitimate child under Ohio law was a question of law, the court
remanded the claim for reinstatement of benefits.
In Marsh v. Heckler, [Sept. 84-Apr. 85 Social Security Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep.
(CCH) 5 15,697 (E.D. Cal. 1984) (unpublished opinion), affd in part, revd in part, 779 F.2d 56
(9th Cir. 1985), the court held that to allow the Appeals Council to reopen would "essentially
extend the sixty (60) day review period to four (4) years." Marsh, [Sept. 84-Apr. 85 Social Secur-
ity Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep. at S 2251.
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disability benefits because of a visual impairment due to a car accident.
After the state denied Fox's claim at both the initial consideration and
reconsideration stages, an ALJ determined that Fox was eligible for
benefits. The Office of Disability Operations disagreed, however, and
approximately five months after the ALU decision - well beyond the
sixty-day review time limit - the Appeals Council reopened the AD
decision. 33 The district court held that the Appeals Council could
reopen sua sponte only for errors of fact. To reach this conclusion, the
court relied upon one of the criteria for reopening for good cause -
when evidence "clearly shows on its face that an error was made."' 34
Including errors of law as well as errors of fact in the definition of
errors would render moot the explicit regulatory mandate for the Ap-
peals Council to review claims that show errors of law. 35 Thus, the
limitation adopted by this district court avoided an open inconsistency
between the review and reopening regulations.
1. The Fact/Law Distinction Does Not Eliminate the Inconsistencies
in the Language of the Regulations
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, rejected this
interpretation 36 when it held that the regulations do not expressly
preclude reopening based on an error of law. 137 It reasoned that
although the Appeals Council cannot reopen when the sole reason is a
"change in legal interpretation,"' 138 an error of law is also an error that
is, as the regulation states, clear from the face of the evidence and
cannot be excluded as a reason for good faith reopening. 39
The fact/law distinction also suffers from several other flaws. Like
the Secretary's interpretation, it does not eliminate the inconsistency
between reopening without cause for one year and reviewing for sixty
days; the Appeals Council can reopen a claim for any reason within
one year but it can review a claim only if it acts within sixty days.140
Furthermore, even if courts restrict reopening under section 404.989
to errors of law, the Appeals Council can still both reopen for errors of
fact for four years and review for errors of fact for sixty days. The
133. Fox, [Social Security Transfer Binder 29] Unempl. Ins. Rep. at 2048-49.
134. 20 C.F.R. § 404.989(a)(3) (1988).
135. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (1988).
136. Fox v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1987), revg. Fox v. Heckler, [Social Security
Transfer Binder 29] Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 16,458 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 1986).
137. Fo, 835 F.2d at 1163.
138. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.989(b) (1988).
139. The Fox court noted that a change in interpretation is not an error that shows clearly on
the face of the evidence. 835 F.2d at 1163-64. The court also noted that the internal SSA man-
ual speaks of reopening as proper when there has been an error of law. In fact, one of the
examples the manual uses to illustrate reopening for clear errors on the face of the evidence is an
error of law. See 835 F.2d at 1164.
140. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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District Court's interpretation does not affect this overlap in the regu-
lations. Thus, this interpretation only eliminated one conflict in the
language of the regulations - the overlap for errors of law. It does
not wholly reconcile the review and reopening provisions.
In summary, the arguments made by these courts are perhaps the
best illustration of the true ambiguity of the regulations. All of the
courts' readings of the regulatory language are equally implausible.
The regulations do not clearly state who may reopen a claim, nor does
placing the reopening regulations in their larger context resolve the
ambiguity. Courts that rely solely upon the SSA's interpretation of
the reopening regulations defer too readily to the agency. The Secre-
tary's interpretation, in this instance, is plainly inconsistent with the
language of the regulations. This frees courts to try to interpret the
regulations in a way that would give a harmonious reading to all of the
provisions. 141 Unfortunately, no court has espoused such an interpre-
tation. These regulations are so poorly constructed that no obvious
reading exists that allows all the regulations to retain full meaning.
Because the language of the regulations compels no particular inter-
pretation, a court must look to the policies the SSA meant the regula-
tions to implement.
III. PARTIALLY LIMITING SUA SPONTE REOPENING BEST
FULFILLS THE POLICIES OF THE SSA AND RECONCILES
THE LANGUAGE OF THE REGULATIONS
The regulations governing reopening are poorly drafted. Even the
SSA has acknowledged this and is contemplating rewriting them. 142
141. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631-32 (1973).
142. The SSA has at the proposed rule stage of rulemaking a proposed change that would
explicitly allow the Appeals Council to reopen a final decision sua sponte. 52 Fed. Reg. 14,296
(1987). However, a legal assistant at the SSA stated that this would probably not move beyond
the proposed rule stage because the SSA was considering more major changes to the Appeals
Council. Telephone interview with Phil Berge, Legal Assistant, Department of Health and
Human Services, Social Security Administration (Aug. 23, 1988). Recently, the SSA drafted new
rules that would have restricted the right to appeal denials of disability benefits. U.S. Drafts
Rules Limiting Appeals on Social Security, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1988, at Al, col. 1. These rules
would have formalized the adjudication process by barring the admission of new evidence and
limiting the issues a claimant could appeal. Id. This measure was rejected by the SSA Commis-
sioner, however, after a storm of protest. 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3484 (1988).
The Administrative Conference of the United States also recommended changes to the Ap-
peals Council. Limiting reopening in the manner suggested in this Note is consistent with these
recommendations.
The Administrative Conference recommended that the Appeals Council change its focus.
Recommendation 87-7: A New Role for the Social Security Appeals Council, in 1 ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1987, at 32-42
(1988). At this time, the Appeals Council members see too many files to give more than a cur-
sory glance at any of them. Instead of concentrating heavily on individual cases, it should begin
to play more of a "systems reform" role. As the body in the SSA that is in an overview position,
the Appeals Council is well suited to become more policy oriented. Under this new direction, the
Appeals Council would still look at a significant number of cases, but the review could be limited
to cases that reflect new issues in disability, problem areas, or random review. Koch & Koplow,
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Barring the possibility of interpreting the regulations to allow each
provision to have full force, courts should choose an interpretation
that best effectuates the policies the regulations were created to imple-
ment. 143 To reconcile the language of the various regulations so as not
to moot any provision while also fulfilling the goals of the SSA, this
Part concludes that the Appeals Council should not be permitted to
reopen claims sua sponte under the provisions allowing reopening for
one year without cause and for four years with good cause. In these
two cases, reopening moots the review regulations and hinders the
achievement of the SSA's goals. Sua sponte reopening should still be
available, however, for those extraordinary cases, such as fraud or sim-
ilar fault, in which the Appeals Council can reopen indefinitely under
section 404.988(c). 144
This Part first demonstrates that the interpretation of the regula-
tions proposed by this Note eliminates many of the inconsistencies be-
tween the language of various sections of the regulations. This Part
next describes the overall objectives of the SSA and identifies which of
these goals own-motion review and sua sponte reopening serve. It then
shows that limiting reopening in the way suggested here will not hin-
der the SSA in achieving its goals. Finally, this Part demonstrates that
limiting reopening will improve the treatment that claimants receive,
an important goal of the SSA. Limiting sua sponte reopening to cases
of fraud or similar fault will increase the acceptability of the adjudica-
tive process by treating claimants in a more open and fair manner.
A. Limiting Sua Sponte Reopening Reconciles the Language
of the Regulations
There are several reasons to draw a distinction between the regula-
tory provision allowing indefinite reopening in limited circumstances
and the provisions allowing reopening without cause within one year
and with cause within four years. This distinction, while appearing
arbitrary, 145 resolves the conflict in the language of the regulations.
The Fourth Bite at the Apple, supra note 26, at 800-08. The Administrative Conference's sugges-
tion acknowledges that the Appeals Council is a political body, not an impartial decisionmaker
and, as such, should play a larger role in guiding the SSA and a smaller role in correcting indi-
vidual decisions.
143. McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 171 (1st Cir. 1987).
144. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c) (1988).
145. This distinction could be subject to one of the objections raised in response to the com-
ponents analysis interpretation - it relies on distinctions not explicitly drawn in the regulations.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text. However, there are several differences between the
two. This interpretation draws a line between two regulations where one has not been explicitly
drawn; but this distinction, unlike the components analysis, is based on the structure of the
regulations. Nor is this interpretation devoid of analogous support elsewhere in the regulations.
This demarcation is based upon the length of time reopening is allowed and the specificity with
which the conditions for reopening are allowed. A similar line is drawn by the SSA in distin-
guishing between claimants from whom the SSA might demand reimbursement for repayment
and those from whom it will not. See supra note 86.
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The standards for reopening a claim within one year and within four
years cause the overlap with the language of the review regulations;
they moot the review regulations because the Appeals Council reopens
a claim for the same reasons it reviews one, and yet the regulations
allow it to do so for a longer period of time.146 Limiting sua sponte
reopening to the truly exceptional circumstances of section 404.988(c)
- the provisions for reopening for fraud or similar fault 47 - would
eliminate this confusion. In contrast to the provisions for reopening
within one year or four years, sua sponte reopening under section
404.988(c) does not invalidate the review regulations; the regulation
enumerates criteria for reopening that only the Appeals Council would
use.148 Here, there has not been a misinterpretation of the evidence or
an error of fact or law on the part of the SSA - the usual reasons for
own-motion review. 149 Under this interpretation, all the portions of
the regulations retain meaning; disallowing all reopening by the Ap-
peals Council would render meaningless the several portions of section
404.988(c) directed expressly toward the Appeals Council, and al-
lowing sua sponte reopening in all situations would render parts of the
review regulations moot.150 Furthermore, this interpretation advances
the goals of the SSA.
B. The Goals of the SSA
Congress intended disability insurance to provide benefits to only
those claimants who are unable to work.' 5' The SSA pursues this aim
by making quality decisions. Commentators suggest that this involves
creating a procedure that, inter alia, produces accurate, consistent,
and timely decisions that are made in a manner acceptable to those
affected by the process. 152 The SSA's main objective has been "to
146. See supra notes 57 and 71 and accompanying text.
147. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c) (1988).
148. The one real exception to this generalization allows indefinite reopening when a decision
was "wholly or partially unfavorable to a party, but only to correct clerical error or an error that
appears on the face of the evidence that was considered when the determination or decision was
made." 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(8) (1988). Several criteria might be utilized by the claimant,
such as if the earnings record were calculated incorrectly, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.988(c)(6), (7),
(10) (1988), but a claimant would never be aware of most of these. The rest of the criteria are
ones that a claimant would not use. Aside from fraud or similar fault, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(1)
(1988), the criteria include a claimant's conviction of a crime affecting his right to receive bene-
fits, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(1 1) (1988); a claimant's conviction for a felony for intentionally caus-
ing the insured's death, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(9) (1988); and another person filing a claim on
the same earnings record as the claimant, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(2) (1988).
149. See supra note 29.
150. Allowing only claimants to reopen would render meaningless all the provisions that
involve situations where only the SSA would want to reopen. It is unlikely, for example, that a
claimant would reopen his claim to have his benefits taken away because he committed fraud.
Allowing sua sponte Appeals Council reopening would moot the 60-day limit on own-motion
review.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1988).
152. HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 102, at xix-xxv, 116-20; Koch & Koplow, The
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make fair and correct decisions." 153 To increase accuracy, it must pre-
vent both false negatives - the situation where qualified claimants are
denied benefits - and false positives - the situation where unquali-
fied claimants are granted benefits. To the extent, however, that accu-
racy cannot be achieved in the context of the type of subjective
decisions ALJs must make regarding disability, the SSA must increase
the consistency of decisions - having the same outcome occur regard-
less of who the decisionmaker is - independent of improving accu-
racy.154 Furthermore, the SSA tries to make these decisions in a
timely and acceptable fashion. Making timely decisions helps to in-
crease claimants' acceptance of the program. A high level of accepta-
bility - a feeling that the process is treating claimants fairly - leads
to a high level of support for the SSA and helps it perform its primary
goals.155 Maintaining the public's trust and good will remains an im-
portant consideration in any process used to decide disability claims.
1. Appeals Council Own-Motion Review and the Goals It Fulfills
Own-motion review by the Appeals Council fulfills two of these
goals: (1) it increases the accuracy of decisions; and (2) it increases the
consistency of decisions. Accuracy is increased through review much
like it is through sua sponte reopening. No matter which procedure is
used, the Appeals Council corrects mistakes made by ALJs, thereby
increasing the number of "correct" decisions. The SSA also uses Ap-
peals Council own-motion review to help increase consistency. Con-
gress, during the funding crisis of the 1970s,156 mentioned two types of
inconsistency: (1) inconsistency between determinations made at the
Fourth Bite at the Apple, supra note 26, at 748. "The American people whose lives we touch
deserve prompt, courteous and efficient service, and fair and dignified treatment." Condition of
State Agencies that Determine Disability Under Social Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1987)
(statement of Dorcas Hardy, Commissioner of Social Security). Accuracy, in this context, has
been defined as "the correspondence of the substantive outcome of an adjudication with the true
facts of the claimant's situation and with an appropriate application of the relevant legal rules to
those facts." Mashaw, supra note 104, at 772, 774. Mashaw claims that the SSA "perceives
fairness not as a perfect opportunity to participate or to contest, but rather as an opportunity to
have one's claim decided on the basis of all the relevant information." Id. at 797.
153. Ways and Means Hearings 1986, supra note 111, at 62.
154. It is conceivable that decisions could be completely inaccurate, yet if every AL made
the same incorrect decisions, the system would be consistent.
155. HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 102, at xxii. Acceptability, in this context, is the
"perceived fairness" of the decision process. Id. at xxiii. There is, of course, a variety of people
to whom the process can, or must, be acceptable. They include Congress, society, and the claim-
ants. Id. at xxiii.
156. The crisis of the mid-1970s in the disability program was caused by an increase in the
number of claims filed, an increase in the number of claims appealed through the system, a
decrease in the percentage of claims allowed at the state level, and an increase in the number of
claims allowed at the AUl level. Chassman & Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearing: A
Case Study in Quality Assurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REa. 801, 807 (1980). See
generally HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 102, at 2-4; Social Security Disability Reviews:
The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Government Man.
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state level and ALJ determinations, demonstrated by the high percent-
age of claims allowed by ALJs at the hearing level; and (2) inconsis-
tency among ALJs, demonstrated by varying allowance rates. 157 As
part of a congressional mandate under the Bellmon Amendments to
eliminate these inconsistencies, the Appeals Council reviews between
ten and fifteen percent of all ALJ decisions "involving the issue of
disability, particularly those allowing previously denied claims." 158
Focusing on decisions in which benefits were granted combats incon-
sistency in allowances between ALJs and the state examiners because
it highlights cases where the two decisionmakers have reached differ-
ent results. Taking a random sample of these claims allows the agency
to identify typical errors made by ALJs, and then to push for greater
uniformity among ALJs.159
2. Appeals Council Sua Sponte Reopening and the Goals It Fulfills
The SSA claims that sua sponte reopening similarly ensures accu-
racy in ALJ decisions. The Appeals Council purportedly uses reopen-
ing in "extraordinary" circumstances to correct clear errors in
individual cases.160 However, in reality, the Appeals Council uses the
same standards to reopen claims that it uses to review claims, 161 and it
corrects the same decisions that it would normally correct through
own-motion review. This increases the accuracy of decisions by cor-
recting individual ALJ mistakes and, therefore, decreasing the number
of false positives and false negatives. The only difference is that in
reopening claims, the Appeals Council can correct decisions for a
longer period of time than it can in reviewing claims.1 62
agement of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 14-41 (1983) (state-
ment of Louis Hays, Asst. Commr., Hearings and Appeals, SSA).
157. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 265, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1405-06. The 1980 (Bellmon) Amendments tried to address the
problems of, inter alia, "improving accountability and uniformity in the administration of the
programs." S. REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1277, 1312. Congress was also worried about uniformity in disability determina-
tions in different states. By giving the Secretary, instead of the states, the authority to establish
standards for adjudication procedures, Congress tried to increase the equity and uniformity of
disability determinations in the different states. S. REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1277, 1333.
158. SOCIAL SECURITY RULINGS, supra note 74, at 64.
159. The Appeals Council, after the Bellmon Amendments, used own-motion review to track
the progress of certain targeted ALJs. An ALI could be targeted either for awarding a high
number of claims or for having unusually low productivity. This policy was discontinued when
the ALIs sued the SSA. The ALJs contended that these targeted reviews threatened their in-
dependent status. See Association of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132
(D.D.C. 1984).
160. Brief for Appellant at 35, McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F. 2d
161 (1st Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1732).
161. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
162. Reopening is allowed for one year for any reason and for four years for good cause,
while review is limited to 60 days. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.969, 404.988 (1988).
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C. Limiting Sua Sponte Reopening Would Not Hinder the SSA's
Ability To Achieve Its Stated Goals
1. Limiting Sua Sponte Reopening Would Not Hinder
the Quest for Accuracy
Achieving accuracy in claim determinations is an important goal,
which both review and reopening attempt to accomplish. Yet, there is
no guarantee that changing the decisions of ALJs by reviewing or re-
opening claims actually leads to more correct decisions. Accuracy is
an elusive concept, difficult to define and impossible to achieve com-
pletely. Furthermore, as this section will argue, even if the SSA could
ensure that all its determinations are "correct," the cost of identifying
and undertaking all the many necessary corrections would outweigh
the social costs of allowing them to remain incorrect. Finally, unlim-
ited sua sponte reopening may actually decrease the number of correct
decisions. This section concludes by arguing that, if the accuracy of
decisions is not affected significantly by sua sponte reopening, then ac-
curacy, while important, cannot dictate which interpretation of the
regulations should be adopted.
Reopening or review may not lead to more accurate decisions. The
very nature of disability claims makes it impossible to single out "in-
correct" decisions. Determinations turn on amorphous criteria such
as pain and ability to work as well as easily verified information such
as age and education level. 163 Ultimately, in many cases, the final de-
termination of disability rests on a subjective decision by an exam-
iner. t64 Different decisionmakers can legitimately arrive at different
conclusions in deciding whether a claimant is disabled without either
one being wrong. This is one reason for the great divergence in ALJ
allowance rates.165 Presently, the SSA defines the Appeals Council
decision as the "correct" one, but this is more the result of administra-
tive fiat than of any empirically valid or principled justification for
relying on the judgment of the Appeals Council over that of the
ALJs.166
Even if the Appeals Council does increase the accuracy of deci-
sions, the savings in costs associated with these decisions may be so
minimal that the SSA spends more money locating the errors and cor-
163. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1988). These standards are better defined now than in the past,
but still lead to subjective determinations. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520-.1529, pt. 404,
Subpt. P, app. 1 (1988).
164. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple, supra note 26, at 682-83.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
166. Just because that decision constitutes the last decision made by the agency does not
mean that the outcome reached is necessarily the correct one, as members of the bureaucracy
admit. HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 102, at xx (There is a constant controversy among
the ALJs and other decisionmaking levels, and among the ALJs themselves, about what consti-
tutes a "correct" decision.). See generally Chassman & Rolston, supra note 156, at 810-14 (only
the Appeals Council has the authority to call an ALU decision an error).
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recting them than it would letting them remain. Although the statute
forces decisionmakers to make bipolar decisions - either a claimant is
disabled or not disabled - disability is better conceptualized as a con-
tinuum that stretches from the clearly able to the completely disabled.
The social costs associated with, for example, a determination that a
completely healthy claimant is disabled are much greater than the so-
cial costs associated with a determination that a claimant is disabled
when he falls just short of meeting the statutory definition. 167 Cases
that are suspectible to different interpretations by different levels of
167. Mashaw, How Much of What Quality? A Comment on Conscientious Procedural Design,
65 CORNELL L. REV. 823, 825 (1980). "These costs include lost productivity when people leave
the work force to receive disability payments, and the demoralization that taxpayers experience
when forced to contribute to the support of others." Id. at 826. The cost of the person not
working is greater the less disabled the person is. The value of a disability determination obvi-
ously grows as a claimant is more disabled. The more disabled the claimant, the harder it would
be for him to work and the greater frustration he would feel trying to work. Id. The costs and
benefits can be combined into one chart:
Net Social
Benefits Curve
C B Eligibility
Continuum
I
Statutory
Standard
To the right of the point where the Act defines a person as disabled, the benefits of making
payments exceed the costs. To the left, the costs exceed the benefits, and the Act classifies the
claimant as not disabled.
If a claimant falls on the continuum of disabled/not disabled at point A, but a determination
finds him to be at point B, a net social loss results - OX. Under the same analysis, if a claimant
falls on the continuum at point B, but a decisionmaker classifies him as being at point A, the net
social loss is OY These lost benefits are greater than if the claimant were "really" at point C on
the continuum, where the social loss would be OZ Id. at 826-27.
+
Social Value
Y
z
0
X
Social Cost
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review - i.e., claims that one AL can believe are meritorious and
that the Appeals Council can disallow - are usually borderline cases,
where the costs to society of an incorrect outcome are negligible.1 68
The costs of pursuing these claims in the name of accuracy may be
greater than the social benefits of allowing untrammeled reopening. 169
Furthermore, sua sponte reopening may actually contravene, not
further, the goal of increased accuracy. Although the SSA has
problems defining accuracy in the context of disability claims, there
are reasons to suspect that an Appeals Council decision may be even
less "correct" than decisions produced at lower levels of the SSA
structure, and in particular by ALJs. In contrast to ALJs, the Appeals
Council members are political decisionmakers and the Appeals Coun-
cil members do not see claimants face-to-face. The Appeals Council is
not independent of the SSA.170 As a branch of the SSA, it can be
swayed by the goals of the agency. For this reason, many ALJs do not
respect the Appeals Council's decisions. Also, Appeals Council mem-
bers rarely ask a claimant to appear for a hearing.17' The Appeals
Council's decision, then, is based upon a short perusal of a claimant's
file, whereas the ALJ bases his decision upon a face-to-face hearing.
The Council's members do not have the chance to observe the intangi-
ble evidence that comes from seeing the disabled claimant. This is
particularly true of those cases that make it to an ALJ hearing: they
are likely to be the borderline cases where a claimant is not clearly
either disabled or not disabled.172 In these cases, the decisionmaker's
observations are of critical importance.' 73 Thus, while the Appeals
Council might define reopening claims as correcting ALJ errors be-
cause it has the "final word," this provides no guarantee that the deci-
sion is actually any more accurate than the AL's decision. In fact,
there is a good chance the decision is less correct. If this is true, then
limiting reopening, far from decreasing accuracy, may actually in-
168. This is the comparison of an incorrect decision concerning claimant A and claimant C
See chart, supra note 167. Comparing the costs, OY and OZ, it is clear there are fewer costs to
society involved with an incorrect decision involving claimant C Professor Mashaw argues that
errors in the close cases are not very costly, and that the costs of detecting them may be greater
than the costs associated with the "incorrect" decision. Mashaw, supra note 167, at 827-28.
Further, he suggests that these close decisions may actually be considered accurate ones, no
matter what the outcome.
169. Notice that this discussion does not include claims that are egregiously erroneous.
170. See supra note 26.
171. Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple, supra note 26, at 730.
172. Chassman & Rolston, supra note 156, at 812 ("[Subjectivity] is typically most trouble-
some in the borderline cases .... ).
173. The importance of seeing the claimant has been acknowledged. Congress, in emphasiz-
ing the importance of a meeting between the decisionmaker and the claimant, said that it allows a
decisionmaker to "better assess the individual's residual functional capacity." H.R. REP. No.
618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1984.U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038, 3054.
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crease it. 174
Thus, concerns about accuracy, although important, do not consti-
tute a reason for the SSA to allow the Appeals Council to reopen sua
sponte in most situations. Accuracy is an elusive ideal in the context
of disability claims and absolute accuracy remains unattainable. Be-
cause review and reopening increase the number of accurate decisions
in the same way, the Appeals Council can still increase accuracy even
without sua sponte reopening by using own-motion review. Further-
more, once the time limit for review has passed, the SSA has other
procedures available to eliminate these incorrect decisions.
a. Methods other than reopening are available to increase accu-
racy. Limiting sua sponte reopening to cases falling within the condi-
tions outlined in section 404.988(c) will not leave the SSA helpless to
change ALJ determinations. Even after the time for review has ended,
the SSA has two methods to eliminate false positives and false nega-
tives; these methods serve the same policies of the SSA as sua sponte
reopening and yet also treat the claimant in a more honest and fair
way. The first, claimant-initiated reopening, adequately addresses the
problem of false negatives. The claimant, although not as knowledge-
able about the system as an SSA staff worker, has the greatest interest
in having the Appeals Council look at an incorrect unfavorable ALJ
decision. Claimant-initiated reopening can then mitigate the harsh re-
sults of res judicata.1 75
The second method, termination proceedings, can correct the
problem of false positives. The SSA periodically re-evaluates claims to
ensure that the claimants are still disabled. 176 This type of review is
174. In limited circumstances, the Appeals Council is dealing with evidence separate from
whether a claimant has qualified for benefits.
175. For example, a claimant cannot file a new claim for the same time period for which a
claim has already been denied; the second claim would be barred by res judicata. Purter v.
Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 691 (3d Cir. 1985). Rigid application of res judicata could result in
inequitable outcomes. The SSA has regulations that allow'it "to refuse to apply [res judicata]
where it would be inequitable to do so." 771 F.2d at 691. The SSA argues that reopening can
help the Appeals Council modify or set aside a judgment when fairness or accuracy would suffer
otherwise, thus circumventing the harsh rule of res judicata. Claimants who do not request
review are barred from bringing their claim a second time. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (1988).
Reopening allows the claim to be reheard and allows the Appeals Council to correct an earlier,
inequitable outcome. One commentator uses McGowen v. Harris, 666 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981),
as an example of a case where a strict adherence to res judicata led to an inequitable result. See 4
K. DAvis, supra note 60, at § 21:4 ("[flailure ... might well be deemed inconsistent with the
Social Security Act's basic purpose"). In McGowan, the claimant's second attempt to obtain
benefits was denied on res judicata grounds even though the claimant had evidence in writing for
the second application that had been just oral evidence in the first application. (The regulations
required written proof, not oral verification in order for the claimant to be eligible for benefits.)
See id. at § 21:4; McGowan, 666 F.2d at 63; see also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 102-03
(1977) (when claimant filed a second claim that was based on the same bases for eligibility, the
AL treated it as a request to reopen because the new application was barred by res judicata).
Note, however, that the SSA argument hypothesizes a situation where the claimants' position has
changed. New evidence creates a situation where res judicata does not apply.
176. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1589 (1988).
1979June 1989]
Michigan Law Review
called a continuing disability review. The SSA performs these reviews
at least once every eighteen months if the claimant's condition is ex-
pected to improve, once every three years if medical improvement can-
not be accurately predicted, and once every five to seven years after
the initial award if the disability is thought to be permanent. 177 Dur-
ing a continuing disability review, if the SSA finds that a claimant's
impairment has improved and the claimant can now work, it may ter-
minate the claimant's benefits. The SSA may also terminate benefits if
"[s]ubstantial evidence demonstrates that any prior disability decision
was in error." 178 Thus, once the SSA identifies an unqualified benefici-
ary, the state may begin termination proceedings. These proceedings
provide the same result as sua sponte reopening - achieving more
accurate results - yet provide claimants with a full array of protective
procedures.179 In order to terminate a claimant, the SSA sends the
claim back to the initial determination level. 180
Not only do termination proceedings provide more procedural
protections, they also are more likely to produce accurate results, be-
cause a termination proceeding provides a forum for a complete re-
view of the facts. The determination of disability is a factual one; each
new piece of evidence can change the overall picture of disability in a
very different way. Having the claimant go through the procedures
anew, instead of having the Appeals Council simply decide the effect
of the new evidence, can lead to more accurate decisions.181
2. Limiting Sua Sponte Reopening does not Inhibit the SSA's Quest
for Consistency
The SSA also tries to make consistent decisions. The Appeals
Council achieves greater consistency through own-motion review, not
sua sponte reopening. Reopening merely corrects individual determi-
177. 20 C.F.R § 404.1590(d)(4) (1988).
178. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 (1988). This exception to the general standard of showing a
change in the claimant's condition will apply retroactively only if the conditions for reopening in
section 404.988 have been met.
179. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1589-.1599 (1988). A termination proceeding follows the same
adjudication procedure as the original decision. The claimant has an initial determination and
may request a reconsideration, AD hearing, and Appeals Council review.
Although the administrative costs associated with these different procedures may be slightly
higher than the costof reopening, they are still virtually de minimus when compared to the cost
of paying a claim. Mashaw estimates that a disability claim is worth approximately $30,000, yet
the cost of deciding a claim is less than $500. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 81 (1983).
Even if the costs of using termination proceedings are higher than the costs of reopening a claim,
they remain small compared to the $30,000 average cost of paying benefits on a claim.
180. The rules on stopping disability benefits suggest that the result of a continuing disability
review could be "a determination ... that you are no longer under a disability." 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1589 (1988). The regulations describe as an initial determination the "[t]ermination of
your benefits." 20 C.F.R. § 404.902(h) (1988).
18 1. If the Appeals Council makes less accurate decisions than the ALJs, it is better to have
decisions made at lower levels by nonpolitical decisionmakers who actually see the claimant. See
supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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nations, it does not try to pinpoint and to correct system-wide discrep-
ancies among ALJs. Many times the Appeals Council will reopen and
change a decision without remanding to the ALJ who made the origi-
nal decision. 182 There is no guarantee that the ALJ will know that the
Appeals Council changed a decision, or will incorporate that change
into his future decisions. 183 In that situation, the Appeals Council has
corrected just one decision, not effected a lasting change in the overall
system. In a system as large as the disability program, if the Appeals
Council wants to increase consistency measurably, it must do more
than just change individual decisions. Own-motion review, on the
other hand, is deliberately engineered to work broader changes. The
Appeals Council randomly reviews claims to find the areas in which
ALJs disagree in their decisions.18 4 This quality control system pro-
vides more feedback than does sua sponte reopening and is tailored to
improve consistency. Hence, limiting sua sponte reopening and forc-
ing the Appeals Council to use own-motion review does not affect the
review process or its goal of achieving consistent decisions.
D. Limiting Appeals Council Sua Sponte Reopening Better Fulfills
the Goals of the SSA
Most of the goals articulated by the SSA can be analyzed in terms
of the "acceptability" of the program. Slow decisions understandably
enrage claimants and lower their faith in the program.' 85 Accurate
decisions lead claimants to feel that they have been treated fairly be-
cause the "correct" decision has been reached. Consistent determina-
tions create an equitable process in which the system treats everyone
in the same manner. When the outcome of a claim depends on which
ALJ hears the appeal, two similarly situated claimants are treated dif-
ferently and claimants perceive the system as arbitrary and unfair.
When a crisis of faith like this occurs, the SSA has failed in its func-
182. One rationale for not remanding is that the AL.Js might protest remands for what could
be termed "judgment errors." Chassman & Rolston, supra note 156, at 816. One suggestion to
counter the remand dilemma is to issue instructional bulletins and reports isolating specific
causes of errors. Id. at 816-17. This method works for the quality reviews the Appeals Council
undertakes, but is not likely to be effective in reopening, which is not done in a systematic man-
ner, and works on a more individual basis.
183. It is important to have the decisionmaker know about the errors she makes. Mashaw
recognizes the value of having errors brought to the attention of the decisionmaker. In sketching
the outlines of a quality review system, he wants information about who made the decision to be
available. Mashaw, supra note 104, at 800.
184. Limiting reopening does not decrease the accuracy and consistency of decisions. Fur-
thermore, it will not prevent the SSA from locating and excluding claimants who are not quali-
fied to receive benefits. If the claimant tries to "free ride" on the disability system by lying, the
claim may still be reopened under this interpretation because the claimant has obtained benefits
through fraud or similar fault. If, however, the claimant is just unqualified, the SSA can use
review within 60 days, and termination proceedings after that, to remove the claimant from the
disability rolls.
185. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
June 1989]
Michigan Law Review
tion of distributing funds to the qualified. 186
a. Limiting Appeals Council sua sponte reopening makes the pro-
cess more acceptable. One important aspect of an acceptable process is
treating claimants in a dignified manner - openly and fairly. While
the SSA cannot satisfy every claimant, claimants can, and do, distin-
guish between having their claim denied and being treated unfairly. 187
An adjudicatory process that treats claimants fairly will prove more
acceptable to claimants than one that confuses and misleads them.
When the SSA treats claims in a way different from the way it
promises to treat them, it only further confuses an already complex
system. In addition, claimants feel that they have been treated un-
justly, and perceive the system as arbitrary and unfair. The openness
and comprehensibility of a system plays an important role in treating
claimants with the dignity and respect they deserve.188
In the past, the Appeals Council has used sua sponte reopening in
place of own-motion review simply because it has missed the sixty-day
limit.189 If the Appeals Council reopens sua sponte in these situations,
reopening is not an "extraordinary" measure, used sparingly in rare
cases, as claimed by the SSA. The Appeals Council, in effect, is substi-
tuting reopening for review without informing claimants. The Ap-
peals Council acts disingenuously by reopening under the same
substantive standards it uses to review claims, without making that
explicitly clear in the language of the regulations. The confusion this
practice engenders demeans claimants and leads them to feel they are
being treated unfairly. Eliminating this form of reopening means that
claimants will receive more respectful treatment. Furthermore, hold-
ing the SSA to the time limit set for review will result in determina-
tions being made in a more timely manner because the Appeals
Council will have to act within sixty days if it wants to review a claim
186. HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 102, at xx-xxiv. For example, one reason Con-
gress passed the Bellmon Amendments and forced the SSA to begin a quality assurance program
was to combat a crisis of faith in the system. See supra note 156.
187. Cf J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 163 (1985). One com-
mentator referred to preserving the dignity of claimants as "civic friendship" - an individual
sees himself "as belonging to a community that shares certain values and counts its members as
worthy of care and concern." Huff, Protecting Due Process and Civic Friendship in the Adminis-
trative State, 42 MoNT. L. REV. 1, 16 (1981). This atmosphere of respect is hard to maintain in
the modern welfare state, where "decent treatment of those who ostensibly benefit from.. .[pro-
grams] has been forgotten." Id. at 17.
188. J. MASHAW, supra note 179, at 90-91.
189.
[The Appeals Council has... come to rely upon the reopening provisions to consider a case
that would have been selected for conventional own-motion review, but the bureaucracy has
moved so slowly that the sixty-day period has already elapsed. In this context, the reopen-
ing provisions greatly enlarge the Appeals Council's opportunity to reverse an ALl's award
and delay the finality of the administrative process.
Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple, supra note 26, at 726; see also supra notes 81-82
and accompanying text.
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on its own motion. This, also, will create a process more acceptable to
claimants.
In cases where the sixty-day limit has not expired, own-motion re-
view provides a ready substitute for sua sponte reopening. It provides
equally consistent decisions while treating claimants in a more digni-
fied manner. If the review deadline has passed, other procedures exist
to replace reopening. These procedures treat claimants with greater
respect than when the Appeals Council reopens sua sponte. Reopen-
ing initiated by the claimant allows him to decide whether to seek fur-
ther agency action, leading him to have a greater feeling of control.
Termination proceedings allow the claimant to use the full array of
procedures a second time. The claimant then has the opportunity to
appeal in the typical fashion through the four levels of the adjudicative
process. 190 This ensures that the claimant has a full opportunity to be
heard, and thereby diminishes the probability that a claimant will feel
like the victim of arbitrary action by a faceless bureaucracy.
However, some situations do exist where the SSA has decided not
to treat claimants with the level of respect usually accorded them or
where sua sponte reopening is beneficial - notably those articulated in
section 404.988(c). In these instances, the Appeals Council should be
able to reopen sua sponte.
b. Limiting reopening allows the Appeals Council to reopen in
cases where factors other than claimants' dignitary rights dominate.
Under the current regulations, the situations where the Appeals Coun-
cil can reopen sua sponte are enumerated in section 404.988(c), which
identifies situations, such as fraud or similar fault, where only the SSA
would have an interest in reopening. 191 In the case where the claimant
has done something illegal, such as caused the death of the person
upon whose earnings the claimant is receiving benefits, 192 it is only
fitting that the SSA have an extraordinary measure available to stop
payments immediately without using time-consuming termination
proceedings. The SSA has decided that the claimant in such cases is
not worthy of the same level of respect and dignity ordinarily ac-
corded claimants. The other types of cases covered by this provision
are ones where evidence concerning the validity of a benefits award
has just become available - for instance, where a person thought dead
is later found to be alive.193 Here, the claimant has already proved his
190. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 36.
192. This category includes cases of fraud or similar fault, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(1) (1988);
where the claimant is convicted of a felony for intentionally causing the death of the insured, 20
C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(9) (1988); or where the claimant is convicted of a crime that affects his right
to receive benefits, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988.(c)(1 1) (1988).
193. This category includes claims where the death of the insured person is finally estab-
lished, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(4y (1988); the insured person is thought to be dead but later is
found to be alive, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(3) (1988); the claimanfis receiving duplicate benefits
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case, and the SSA must just make this final administrative conclusion
before a claimant can begin receiving benefits. 194 In this situation,
there is little danger of abuse of discretion by the Appeals Council,
and the claimant is treated justly. Allowing sua sponte reopening
under this provision retains meaning for section 404.988(c) - a claim-
ant would not initiate reopening to inform the Appeals Council he had
committed fraud - without hindering the goals of the SSA.
CONCLUSION
The language of the reopening regulations is ambiguous; it can be
read either to allow or to disallow the Appeals Council sua sponte re-
opening. Viewing the regulations in the broader context of the adjudi-
cation system for disability claims only enhances the confusion.
Unlimited sua sponte reopening by the Appeals Council moots the
strict time limit established for review of claims - the Appeals Coun-
cil uses the same criteria to reopen as to review but can reopen for a
longer time period. However, allowing only claimants to initiate re-
opening renders meaningless portions of the reopening regulations
which would only be used by the Appeals Council. Limiting reopen-
ing to the special circumstances outlined in section 404.988(c) resolves
this difficulty. It retains the full force of the regulations in the circum-
stances in which only the Appeals Council would utilize reopening,
yet does not moot the review regulations; the criteria articulated in
section 404.988(c) - fraud or similar fault - are much narrower than
the criteria for review.
This interpretation also best effectuates the goals of the SSA -
making consistent, accurate decisions in a timely fashion while accord-
ing claimants the respect and dignity they deserve. The Appeals
Council can use review instead of reopening to ensure consistency and
accuracy. For those cases in which the sixty-day time limit for review
passes, termination proceedings are always available to cut undeserv-
ing claimants from the disability rolls. These two procedures are also
more likely to lead to more consistent and accurate decisions than sua
sponte reopening. Furthermore, this interpretation eliminates any dis-
ingenuous use of reopening; the Appeals Council can no longer use
reopening to effectively "review" a case when the time period for re-
view has lapsed. The claimant knows exactly when reopening will oc-
cur, and under what conditions. Claimants thus feel that the SSA is
treating them in an honest, respectful way, which increases the pub-
from the Railroad Retirement Board, 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(5) (1988); or the SSA has calcu-
lated a claimant's earning record incorrectly for a variety of possible reasons, 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.988(c)(6), (7), (10) (1988).
194. See supra note 36.
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lie's satisfaction with, and belief in the integrity of, the system as a
whole.
- Elizabeth S. Ferguson
